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ABSTRACT 
 
 The higher the level of information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, the higher 
is the firm’s reluctance to raise money externally, potentially leading to investment distortions. An 
improved disclosure system reduces information asymmetry and therefore, lessens the adverse 
selection effects of external financing, thereby moderating investment inefficiencies. In this paper, 
we examine the impact of potentially improved transparency stemming from stricter disclosure 
requirements (Clause 49) on financing and investment decisions of Indian firms.  The results show 
that reliance of Indian firms on internal financing in the pre-reform period gives way to greater use 
of external financing in the post-reform period, and alleviation in financial constraints.  While 
expanded funding sources do not seem to improve investment unambiguously, firms that suffered 
under-investment prior to the reform show a significant improvement in investment post-
reform.  Firms also increase their financial slack making it possible for them to engage 
in acquisitions within India as well as abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, Financing, Investment, Efficiency 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 “When managers have access to unlimited discretionary resources, investment converges to the 
efficient level. However, when managers are resource-constrained, there will be too little 
investment, because there are frictions associated with raising finance externally.” Stein (2003)1 
Information asymmetry between a firm’s managers and capital providers exists because 
managers have access to superior information that they cannot reveal for proprietary reasons to the 
fund suppliers. Major frictions accompanying information asymmetry between managers and 
investors are adverse selection (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). These frictions lead to distorted financing and investment decisions. If investors 
believe that managers can exploit private information to issue overpriced securities, acting 
rationally, they either ration capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Miller and Rock, 1985) or increase 
financing cost (Lambert et. al, 2007). An inevitable outcome of the asymmetry problem is the 
firm’s reluctance to issue external funding and consequent over-reliance on internal financing, 
which in turn increases sensitivity of investment to cash flows, potentially leading to 
underinvestment. Mitigation of information asymmetry curbs adverse selection (Leuz and 
Verrechhia, 2000), decreases cost of capital (Lambert et.al. 2007; Francis et al. 2005), increases 
stock liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson 1986), and enhances investment efficiency (Biddle, Hilary 
and Verdi, 2009). 
One conduit to increase the availability of firm information to the public is improved 
disclosure of financial information. Adequate and timely disclosure allows investors to evaluate 
firm performance, lessens the information risk borne by them, attracts higher premium and 
                                                          
1 Excerpts taken from page # 114-115 of Stein, Jeremy C. "Agency, information and corporate investment." Handbook 
of the Economics of Finance. Vol. 1. Elsevier, 2003. 111-165. 
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enhances firm value (Barry and Brown, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; 
Lobo and Zhou, 2001).  By fostering transparency, disclosure of financial information leads to a 
decrease in the contracting costs of adverse selection, thereby improving a firm’s financing and 
investment decisions.  
Despite the benefits of transparency, however, managers may be reluctant to voluntarily 
disclose information as the increased scrutiny and discipline by the markets may impede their 
desire to promote self-interest (Coffee, 1984). In addition, managers might selectively increase 
disclosure in short term while raising capital (Cheng and Lo, 2006; Clinton et al., 2014), or they 
might purposely try to withhold any negative information in disclosing value relevant information 
(Graham et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). Such problems are exacerbated in emerging markets, 
such as India, where the intervention by regulatory bodies becomes necessary to force managers 
to disclose. 
The Clause 49 reforms undertaken by India in 2000 provide a unique opportunity to study 
the effect of enhanced disclosure requirements on financing and investment decisions of Indian 
firms. Clause 49 is a series of reforms introduced by the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) to impose stricter and more comprehensive disclosure requirements on Indian firms.2 In 
this paper, we study the impact of the Clause 49 reforms on the financing decisions, financial 
constraints, investment decisions, and firm performance. Extant research on the impact of Clause 
49 reforms document a reduction in beta risk of Indian stocks (Bhattacharya and Rao, 2005), and 
an increase in firm value in the post-reform period (Balasubramanian, Black, and Khanna, 2010; 
                                                          
2 In addition to requiring fuller disclosure, the provisions of Clause 49 include other improvements in corporate 
governance such as the role and composition of boards, independence of directors and greater role for audit 
committees. 
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Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). We contribute to this line of literature by focusing on whether 
the reforms affect financing and investment decisions of Indian firms, and whether the improved 
disclosure alleviates financial constraints for the firms. 
Our sample includes 1280 publicly trading Indian firms during the period 1996 to 2008 
(18,900 firm years). Consistent with our expectation, we find that the reforms increase financing 
for firms that did not have access to other capital markets. This result persists after controlling for 
endogeneities and self-selection bias inherent in the financing of these firms. Further, the increase 
in external financing is related to the degree of information asymmetry of the firms in the pre-
reform period – firms that suffer higher information asymmetry prior to the reform show a greater 
increase in external financing after the reform. Complying firms also show alleviation in present 
and expected future financial constraints, and the effect is more pronounced for domestic firms 
confined to the Indian capital markets relative to cross-listed firms with access to foreign capital 
markets. While not all firms increase their long-term investment levels post-reform, firms that 
suffer under-investment pre-reform show a significant increase in their long-term investment post-
reform. Firms increase their total investment (long-term + short-term) post-reform, predominantly 
through increases in cash holdings. Firm performance also improves post-reform, with increased 
investment driving the performance improvement in financially constrained firms that suffer 
under-investment prior to the reform. Finally, acquisition patterns suggest that the post reform 
period coincides with a concurrent increase in internal and external acquisitions by Indian firms. 
We conjecture that perhaps firms increase their financial slack to facilitate acquisitions. Our results 
suggest that the mandatory disclosure reforms were at least partially effective in improving 
transparency, alleviating financial constraints, improving capital access, and increasing investment 
in Indian markets. 
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The results of the study emphasize the importance of government-mandated reforms in 
emerging stock markets, such as India, where only a few firms resort to voluntary disclosures in 
their efforts to raise funds in domestic markets. Domestic firms confined only to the Indian capital 
markets seem to respond positively to well-regulated mandates. Our results provide support for 
the efficacy of mandatory disclosure reforms, especially in markets that suffer information opacity.  
2. Clause 49 Reforms 
The Indian capital market was considered to be opaque and not conducive to growth until 
1990. The liberalization of Indian economy in 1991 resulted in steady economic growth forcing 
Indian firms to seek capital to finance expansions. Until then, firms relied on government financial 
agencies who provided both debt and equity for their funding requirements (Balasubramanian, 
Black, and Khanna, 2010). Bhattacharya and Rao (2005) suggest that capital market and corporate 
governance reforms seemed to be the only feasible solution to reduce opacity of business 
environment in India. They argue that family business dominated the economic landscape and 
these businesses had no incentive to disclose information voluntarily as they could rely on their 
extensive internal capital for investment opportunities. Additionally, long delays in judicial 
proceedings restricted the capability of intermediaries in bridging the information gap. It fell to the 
Indian government to then mandate disclosure and best governance practices in order to foster and 
support economic growth. 
India began the process of creating a transparent, efficient, and fair corporate environment 
with the setup of the Cadbury Committee of the Financial Reporting Council in 1991. The 
committee investigated the accountability of the Board of Directors (BoD) to shareholders and 
recommended improving the internal financial controls of the system (Cadbury Report, 1992). A 
couple of recommendations were developed and proposed between 1991 and 2000; however, only 
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a few companies adopted them which did not significantly change the existing practices by Indian 
companies. Later, the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee was set up by Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI). This committee recommended new mandates on corporate governance 
which SEBI incorporated in its Listing Agreement contained in Clause 49 in 2000, henceforth 
Clause 49. 
Although Clause 49 was introduced in 2000, a unique feature of this clause is that it was 
implemented in phases over next 3 years for different group of companies. The largest group of 
firms (BSE Group A) were required to comply to the mandate by March 2001, then medium sized 
firms (with equity capital less than ₹10 crore and greater than 3 cr.) by March 2002, and finally 
small sized firm (with paid up equity capital greater than 3 cr.) by March 2003. Firms with less 
than ₹3 cr. in paid up equity capital were not required to comply with the rules.  Appendix 1 shows 
the main events and dates of the different reform mandates of Clause 49. 
The changes focused on including a section on corporate governance in the annual report, 
improving the quality and quantity of disclosure (disclosing all relevant information related to 
dividend, listing, market price, performance relative to indices, distribution, etc.) to shareholders, 
formation of shareholders’ grievance committee, incorporating “management discussion and 
analysis” section in the annual report, increasing the role and composition of boards as well as 
audit committee, and enhancing the responsibility and independence of BoD. Firms with a paid-
up capital greater than ₹30 million were required to comply with the covenants or face a penalty 
for non-compliance. The main covenants of Clause 49 are set out in Appendix 3.  
Initially the penalty for non-compliance was delisting of the firm, however later, this was 
revised to impose severe financial penalties on directors for non-compliance. Monetary penalties 
were also introduced in the amendments to Clause 49. However, there is little information 
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regarding enforcement of these reforms (Sanan and Yadav, 2011). Sanan and Yadav (2011) 
construct a Corporate Governance Transparency and Disclosure Score (CGS) for each firm, which 
shows only a moderate level of disclosure by Indian firms. This emphasized the need of strong 
enforcement of the Clause 49 mandates and covenants.  
Several amendments to the Clause 49 were undertaken in 2004 that reinforce the original 
intent of protecting the interests of investors through enhanced governance practices and 
disclosures. Major changes include improving quality of financial disclosures (including those 
relating to related party transactions and proceeds from public/rights/preferential issues, 
requiring CEO/CFO certification of financial statements, improving disclosures to shareholders, 
better defining of  independent directors, strengthening the responsibilities of audit committees, 
and requiring boards to adopt formal code of conduct. Enactments of above changes were deferred 
until January 2006 due to industry resistance to accept such comprehensive reforms.  
3. Impact of Clause 49 on Financing, Constraints, Investment, and Value  
Enhanced disclosure of financial data results in lowering of information asymmetry or 
boosting the “corporate transparency”, where corporate transparency is defined by Bushman et.al. 
(2001) as the availability of firm specific information to outsiders. There is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that proper disclosure decreases costs of financing (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrechhia, 
2001), lowers a firm's bid-ask spread, improves analysts' coverage and stock liquidity (Welker, 
1995; Healy et al,1999). Further, disclosure enables shareholder to monitor managers thereby 
improving project selection and reducing cost of financing. 
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3.1. Reduced information asymmetry and financing decisions  
Adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984) results when managers have private 
information unknown to investors. In anticipation of managers exploiting private information to 
issue overpriced securities, investors either ration capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Miller and 
Rock, 1985) or increase financing cost (Lambert et. al, 2007). An inevitable consequence is that 
managers are reluctant to raise external funding and, thus, depend heavily on internal source of 
funds.  
On the other hand, disclosure enables shareholders to monitor managers, thereby 
improving project selection and reducing cost of financing (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrechhia, 
2001). Consistent with the argument, Botosan (1997) documents a negative relation between a 
firm's level of voluntary disclosure and its cost of equity capital. Sengupta (1998) finds that good 
quality financial disclosure reduces the lender's’ perception of default risk and hence reduces the 
cost of debt. To sum, higher disclosure results in reduced information asymmetry which in turn 
acts as a mechanism for reduction in cost of external financing (Balakrishnan et. al, 2014).  
Given the nature of business environment, Indian firms are expected to rely more heavily 
on internal financing (than external financing) in the pre-reform period. Higher disclosure because 
of rule change is expected to mitigate adverse selection problem and improve information 
environment. The reform should lower the contracting costs of adverse selection in the post-reform 
period relative to that of the pre-reform period, which, in turn, should facilitate greater use of 
external financing post-reform. Thus, we hypothesize  
Hypothesis 1A: Indian firms will increase their external financing in the post-reform period 
relative to the pre-reform period. 
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Hypothesis 1B: The ratio of internal to external capital would decrease in the post-reform period 
relative to the pre-reform period. 
3.2.  Reduced information asymmetry and financial constraints 
In frictionless capital markets, investment decisions of a firm should be a function of firm’s 
investment opportunities and be independent of the firm’s financing decisions. In presence of 
friction, investment decisions become dependent upon the availability of internal funds. As a 
result, managers adopt/change financial policies to ensure sufficient financing for important 
investments. Under such a scenario, effect of incremental cash flow on firms’ investment and cash 
holdings should be higher (Erel et. al. 2013).  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and others 
have documented a robust relation between a firm’s cash flows and its investments.  
In the same vein, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) suggest that firms facing 
financial constraints will choose to allocate additional cash flows to increase their investments 
both today and, in the future, implying that the fraction of cash retained by a firm from incremental 
cash flows reflects management’s own view on whether the firm is likely to face financial 
constraints in the future. Investment sensitivity of cash flow measures the effect of constraints 
on today’s investment, while the cash sensitivity to cash flow reflects management’s assessment 
of future constraints (Erel et. al., 2013).  
In the context of Indian firms, we expect a positive relation between incremental cash flow 
on firms’ investment and cash holdings in the pre-reform period. The reform should relax financial 
constraints facing Indian firms in the post-reform period. The sensitivity should decrease in the 
post- reform period as more funds become available to firms owing to increased transparency. 
Hence, we predict the following: 
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Hypothesis 2: Sensitivity of cash to cash flow and sensitivity of investment to cash flow should 
decline in the post reform period relative to the pre-reform period. 
3.3.  Reduced information asymmetry and investment decisions  
Investment is considered efficient at the optimal level where firm’s value is maximized. 
Information asymmetry leads to costly financing which in turn deters managers from taking up 
some projects that would have been accepted if the information asymmetry and resulting cost of 
capital was lower.  There is a growing literature providing evidence that improved financial 
reporting positively affects firms’ investment opportunity schedule (Hope and Thomas, 2008; 
Biddle et al., 2009; Beatty et al., 2010; and Cheng et al. 2013) as projects that were rejected in the 
past because of higher cost of capital have now become acceptable on account of lower hurdle 
rates.   
In the context of Clause 49, we expect firms to pass up investment opportunities due to 
costly external financing stemming from adverse selection. Clause 49 brings in stricter disclosure 
rules which reduces information asymmetry and encourages external fund suppliers to supply 
funds at a lower cost than they might have demanded in the pre-clause period. Investments in the 
post clause period, are expected to be stimulated because of cheaper funding opportunities. Thus, 
we hypothesize, 
Hypothesis 3A: Investment level will increase significantly in post-reform period as compared to 
pre-reform period. 
Hypothesis 3B: Cash level will decrease significantly in post-reform period as compared to pre-
reform period. 
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3.4.  Reduced information asymmetry and firm performance 
Finally, to complete the picture, we show and expect investment efficiency attributed to 
more stringent (and more rigorously monitored) disclosure requirements should lead to better 
market performance of Indian firms. This question though, has already been taken up by 
Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) where they provide evidence of an increase in firm value due to 
the rule change. We provide an incremental contribution by looking at whether the improved 
performance is as result of increase in investment efficiency.  
Hypothesis 4: Performance improvement positively related to investment improvement. 
4. Data, sample, and variables 
4.1.  Main sample and Subsamples 
We obtain data via ProwessIQ from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) database. 
CMIE is Mumbai based research organization that provides financial performance of 48,977 
companies. Both accounting and market data are extracted from the CMIE database. Cross listing 
data are retrieved from London Stock exchange, Luxembourg stock exchange and website 
www.topforeignstocks.com.  
The initial sample comprises of listed Indian firms covering 1996 through 2008 with 
18,900 firm-year observations. We exclude the financial firms that operate with NIC code 64, 65 
and 66 and consist of commercial banks, insurance companies, diversified financial services, and 
brokerage houses. We start the sample period from 1996 because of missing variables prior to 
1995. We define 1996- 2000 as the pre-clause period, 2001-2005 as the transition period (as the 
provisions of the reform could not be fully implemented due to industry resistance to accept 
comprehensive reforms), and 2006-2008 as the post-clause period. Post 2008 data is not included 
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because of two reasons: 1) we attempt to avoid distortions in the accounting and financial data 
caused by the onset of financial crisis that began at the end of 20083, and 2)   starting April 2011, 
Indian firms are required to present their financial data in accordance with revised schedule VI 
disclosure format of Companies’ Act,1956, making it mandatory for companies to broadly classify 
their assets and liabilities into ’Current’ and ’Non-current’ categories. Such detailed information 
was not available for the years prior to 2011, making it difficult to compare post-2011 period with 
the pre-2011 period. 
For robustness checks, we divide the full sample in finer subsamples. First subdivision is 
based on whether the firm is listed on Indian exchanges only or it is cross-listed (i.e., domestic as 
well as foreign exchanges). We call the first group cross-listed or CL and second group as non-
cross-listed or NCL. We have 1,115 NCL and 31 CL firms in our sample. Cross listing data is 
retrieved from London Stock Exchange, Luxembourg Stock Exchange and website 
topforeignstocks.com. Second, NCL firms are further subdivided in 3 groups: 1) firms with paid 
up share4 capital of Rs. 100 million and above, or net-worth of Rs. 250 million or more at any time 
in the history of the company, as on January 1, 2000 are termed as NCL-Large5; 2) firms having a 
paid-up share capital of Rs. 30 million and above (but below Rs. 100 million) are defined as NCL-
Small; and 3) the firms not fulfilling the criteria for the above two NCL groups are defined as 
group of Excluded firms or EF group.6  
                                                          
3 The global financial crisis seemed to hit Indian market in the last quarter of 2008 (Kumar et al 2009). Our sample 
period from 2006-2008 is expected to be not affected by the crisis. 
4 Paid-up share capital: This data includes paid-up values of equity shares that have been subscribed and allotted. It 
does not include amount that a company over and above its face value if it issues security at a premium. That amount 
is reflected via Security Premium reserves. We sum paid-up share capital and security premium reserves to get book 
value of equity capital.  
5INR-USD conversion rate for March 31, 2000 was 43.62 
1 crore=10 million 
₹10 crore =₹100 million=$4362 million 
6 These EF firms happen to be the smallest firms in our sample when sorted on paid-up equity capital.  
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Table 1 : Distribution of Sample 
Distribution of a sample of 1260 firms over the period 1996-2008. These firms are divided into 
groups based on their conformity to Clause 49. Firms with paid up share capital of more than Rs. 
30 million are subjected to the rule change and are defined as conforming firms while the ones that 
are waived from conforming are excluded firms (EF firms). Conforming firms are then further 
divided into cross listed firms (CL firms) and domestically listed (NCL Firms). Further, 
conforming domestically listed firms (NCL Firms) are divided into groups based on their size. 
Firms with a paid-up share capital of Rs. 30 million and above are defined as NCL_Small firms, 
while firms with paid up share capital of Rs. 100 million and above, or net-worth of Rs. 250 million 
or more at any time during the sample period are termed as NCL_Large firms. All firm level data 
for accounting variables is obtained from CMIE-Prowess database. List of cross listed firms is 
retrieved from London Stock exchange, Luxembourg stock exchange and website 
topforeignstocks.com.  
 
 # of Firms # of Firm-Year Obs. 
Total 1260 18900 
Conforming Firms 1146 17190 
Domestically Listed Firms 1115 16725 
NCL Small Firms 481 7215 
NCL Large Firms 634 9510 
Cross Listed Firms 31 465 
Non-Conforming Firms 114 1710 
 
4.2.  Variables 
Measures of Capital:  
For all the firms and the sub group of firms in our sample, we classify the financing 
channels in following categories: 
1) TBorrEq = It is the sum of equity capital and borrowing deflated by total assets. It represents 
total external financing for any firm. Equity capital is the sum of paid up share capital and 
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security premium reserves where paid up equity capital is the face value of shares subscribed 
to by the common shareholders and security premium reserves accounts for any premium paid 
over the face value. Borrowing is the sum of debt from all sources including banks, financial 
institution, corporate and individuals and others. CMIE Prowess database provides detail 
information on possible sources of borrowing. We expect TBorrEq to increase in the post-
reform period.  
2) TBondEq = It is the sum of equity capital and bonds deflated by total assets. It represents 
funding from market. Though bonds are very small part of the total lending from external 
sources, this variable has the higher probability of being affected by the rule change. Out of 
the constituents of total external financing, we assume that funds7 raised from capital market 
would be subjected to more information asymmetry as compared to other components of 
borrowing8. For example, borrowings from banks and financial institution generally require 
information via private channels and as such are less likely to be affected by the Clause 499. 
Indeed, we expect TBondEq to witness a greater impact of Clause 49 as compared to TBorrEq. 
3)  RE/ExtFin = It is the ratio of total internal financing sourced from retained earnings to total 
external financing i.e TBorrEq. The ratio is expected to gauge the relative change in internal 
financing as compared to external financing. We expect this ratio to decline in the post reform 
period.  
                                                          
7 Borrowing from market is the outstanding value of funds raised by a company through issue of debentures and bonds. 
8 There are alternate channels of borrowing (Allen et.al, 2012, not to directly affected by Clause 49, hence not taken 
up in the analysis. 
9 For more detail on break up borrowing, read Love, Inessa, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria. Firm Financing in 
India: Recent Trends and Patterns. Vol. 3476. World Bank Publications, 2005. 
They suggest that among different financing sources of financing, “Bank borrowing” represents the largest category 
(averaged 47% of total borrowing), “borrowing financial institution” averaged 22% of Total, “Borrowing from 
corporations” averaged over 9%. On the other hand, public borrowing and foreign borrowing are relatively small 
fractions of total borrowing, averaging less than 1 and 5 percent of total borrowing, respectively. 
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Measures of Investment:   
1) Capex= It is the investment in fixed assets and measured as change in gross fixed asset (GFA) 
plus sale of PPE divided by total assets (TA)  
Capex = [GFAt - GFAt-1 + Sale PPEt] / TAt. It denotes long -term investment of a firm. 
2) Investment= It is the investment in total assets and measured as change in total asset plus sale 
of PPE normalized to total assets in t-1. 
Investment= [TAt - TAt-1] / TAt-1. It denotes investment in both current assets and fixed assets 
of a firm. 
3) CapexRD= It is the investment in fixed assets and research and development of a firm. It is 
measured as change in gross fixed assets plus R&D expenses in the year t plus sale of PPE in 
year t normalized to total assets in t-1. 
CapexRD= [GFAt - GFAt-1 + Sale PPEt + R&Dt] / TAt. It denotes both long -term investment 
and current investment of a firm. 
Measures of Financial Slack:   
4) Cash = Cash and cash equivalents of a firm is used to represent short term liquidity of a firm. 
It is deflated to total assets.  
Measures of Performance:   
1) ROA = Return on assets is used to proxy for market performance of the firm. 
2) TobinQ = Tobin’s Q is used as another proxy for growth in market. It is measured as total 
assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets.  
Control variables: 
1) Size = It is defined as the log of total assets.  
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2) CashFlow = It is proxy of liquidity of the firms and is defined as the sum of profit after tax and 
depreciation and amortization deflated to total assets of the firm. 
3) EBDITA= It is the profit before depreciation interest and taxes deflated by total assets.  
4) Salesgrowth = It sis the change in sales from year to t-1 to t as a percent of sales in year t-1. It 
is proxied for investment opportunities of a firm.  
5) M_B = Another proxy for investment opportunities is the market to book ratio of a firm. It is 
defined as the ratio market capitalization to book value of equity.  
6) STDROA = The measure of volatility in earning is given by this variable. STDROA is obtained 
from 5 years rolling standard deviation for variable Profits before depreciation, interest and 
taxes and amortization. 
7) GDP = It is the annual growth in gross domestic product in India. The data is obtained from 
the World Bank website. It is a proxy used to control for macro-economic changes in India. 
8) InterestRate = Another proxy to control for macro-economic changes is given by prime 
lending rate in India 
Reform Period: 
1) TD = Set to 1 for post period (2006-2008) and 0 for pre-period (1996-2000. 
Sub-Samples: 
1) Classdummy = It is an indicator variable set to 0 for stand-alone firms, 1 for IBG firms and 2 
for state-owned firms.  
2) CL_NCL = Set to 1 for NCL firms and 0 for CL firms. 
3) CL_NCLLarge = Set to 1 for NCL-Large firms and 0 for CL firms. 
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4) Large_Small = Set to 1 for NCL-Small firms and 0 for NCL-Large firms. 
5) NA_NCLSmall = Set to 1 for NCL-Small firms and 0 for EF firms. 
6) FCdummy = 1 for financially constraint and 0 for less constraint firms 
7) Invdummy = 1 for firms that showed under-investment using Richardson’s measure in the pre-
period and 0 for firms that over-invested in the pre period 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
We compare the summary statistics of sample and sub samples in this section. We divided 
the sample into industry following Mukherjee (2013). Table 2 shows that approx. 4% of the firms 
are agriculture based, more than 80% are manufacturing based heavy industries and approx. 15% 
of our sample are service based industries. There is a huge variation in the size of sample based on 
total assets. 39% of the sample have total assets of less than Rs. 500 million, 50% have TA in 
between Rs. 500 million to Rs. 10,000 million and the remaining 11% have total assets in excess 
to Rs. 10,000 million.  
Further, Table 2 reports that firms in the NCL firms are younger and smaller as compared to the 
CL group of firms. The mean age of CL firms are 50 years while that of NCL firms are 28 years. 
EF firms belong in the lowest size group.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for the sample. The dataset comprises 18,900 firm year 
observation from 1260 firms covering the period from 1996-2008. The summary includes 
distribution of total assets of the firms and their industry classification. The firms are classified 
using national industry classification (NIC)-2008 issued by Ministry of Statistics and Programme 
Implementation, Government of India. 
table 2 continued 
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Distribution of Assets (in rupees million): 
Total Assets  Freq. Percent 
Less than 500 7,365 38.97 
Between 500 and 10, 000  9,452 50.01 
More than 10,000 2,083 11.02 
Total 18,900 100 
 
Industry Classification: 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Agriculture 735 3.89 
Manufacturing 15,330 81.11 
Service 2,835 15 
Total 18,900 100 
 
5.2.  Financing 
Hypothesis 1 asserts that, in an opaque market, managers attempt to void external financing 
and rely more heavily on internal sources of financing. We use the following steps to test the 
hypothesis.  
Higher disclosure is expected to mitigate adverse selection problem and improve 
information environment. Increase in transparency and information availability is likely to reduce 
the contracting cost between firms and investors which in turn, would allow managers to have 
increased access to capital.   
5.2.1. Univariate analysis 
We compare the level of financing of the sample firms in the pre-reform and post reform 
period. We expect the measures of financing to increase in post reform period. Table 3 presents 
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summary statistics in both pre-period and post-period. The difference test shows whether the 
increase is significantly different from zero.   
Table 3 : Financing Descriptive 
This table presents the univariate results for the financing variables in the pre-reform and post-
reform period. We have three measures of financial variables: 1) TBorrEq is total external 
financing measured as a sum of total equity capital and total borrowings by firms, 2) TBondEq is 
the market-based financing measured as a sum of total equity capital and public borrowings 
(bonds) by firms, 3) RE/TBorrEq is measured as a ratio of internal to external financing measures 
as Retained earnings (RE) divide by TBorrEq. All firm level data is obtained from CMIE-Prowess 
database. List of cross listed firms is retrieved from London Stock exchange, Luxembourg stock 
exchange and website topforeignstocks.com.  
Panel A denotes all firms as a sample. Panel B summarizes Cross-Listed (CL) firms in the sample, 
Panel C denotes domestic firms subjected to Clause 49 (NCL) firms. Panel D and E are NCL_Large 
and NCL_Small group of firms. Panel F denotes firms that are waived from Clause 49 (NA) firms. 
Data with suffix “Pre” denotes value in the Pre-reform period (1996-2000) while those with suffix 
“Post” denotes data value in post reform period (2006-2008). We assess the difference in means 
using the mean difference test and median using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The symbol ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Mean Median 
 
Pre Post Diff P-Value Pre Post P-Value 
Panel A: All Firms 
EqTA 0.261 0.231 -0.030 0.000 0.218 0.159 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.391 0.408 0.018 0.002 0.379 0.348 0.0000 
TBorrEq 0.653 0.646 -0.007 0.352 0.625 0.548 0.0000 
TBondEq 0.287 0.246 -0.042 0.000 0.252 0.168 0.0000 
Ratio 0.054 0.108 0.053 0.000 0.042 0.095 0.0000 
Panel B: CL Firms 
EqTA 0.205 0.127 -0.078 0.000 0.201 0.117 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.350 0.262 -0.088 0.000 0.377 0.248 0.0000 
TBorrEq 0.554 0.389 -0.165 0.000 0.579 0.378 0.0000 
TBondEq 0.275 0.150 -0.125 0.000 0.281 0.140 0.0000 
Ratio 0.089 0.353 0.264 0.000 0.036 0.195 0.0000 
table 3 continued 
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Panel C: NCL Firms 
EqTA 0.274 0.245 -0.029 0.000 0.232 0.171 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.393 0.419 0.026 0.000 0.383 0.357 0.0012 
TBorrEq 0.668 0.672 0.004 0.610 0.642 0.564 0.0000 
TBondEq 0.301 0.261 -0.040 0.000 0.264 0.182 0.0000 
Ratio 0.057 0.093 0.036 0.000 0.041 0.093 0.0000 
Panel D: NCL_Large Firms 
EqTA 0.217 0.203 -0.014 0.011 0.183 0.140 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.402 0.414 0.012 0.112 0.397 0.360 0.0000 
TBorrEq 0.620 0.624 0.004 0.684 0.598 0.528 0.0000 
TBondEq 0.257 0.225 -0.032 0.000 0.227 0.152 0.0000 
Ratio 0.072 0.130 0.058 0.000 0.040 0.098 0.0000 
Panel E: NCL_Small Firms 
EqTA 0.349 0.301 -0.048 0.000 0.301 0.222 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.382 0.426 0.044 0.000 0.356 0.355 0.5668 
TBorrEq 0.732 0.736 0.004 0.751 0.693 0.616 0.0000 
TBondEq 0.357 0.308 -0.049 0.000 0.311 0.229 0.0000 
Ratio 0.039 0.045 0.006 0.592 0.042 0.085 0.0000 
Panel E: EF Firms 
EqTA 0.153 0.122 -0.032 0.002 0.104 0.082 0.0000 
BorrTA 0.377 0.340 -0.036 0.043 0.344 0.310 0.0629 
TBorrEq 0.537 0.462 -0.075 0.001 0.476 0.444 0.0026 
TBondEq 0.159 0.123 -0.036 0.001 0.109 0.082 0.0000 
Ratio 0.014 0.186 0.172 0.000 0.050 0.104 0.0000 
 
The result in Table 3 shows the mean value of measures of financing for all firms and sub 
group of firms. Comparing it across time, we find that TBorrEq (total external financing) does not 
change for the NCL firms (large or small). The result implies that during the pre-period when 
opacity prevailed, it is likely that firms predominantly relied on some channels of external 
borrowing (i.e., borrowing from banks and financial institutions). However, in the post period, an 
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increase in transparency changed the relative cost of different components of capital and opened 
more funding channels for the firms. So, firms can change the optimal belnd of capital if they do 
not require to increase the level of capital just because they will have more choices in the post-
period relative to the pre-period.  
Before jumping to any conclusion, we evaluate the effect of increased transparency on 
firms’ means of financing through regression controlling statistically for other factors in the next 
section. After all, we cannot base our findings solely on univariate results. 
5.2.2. Fixed effects estimation  
We estimate multivariate models predicting firms financing decision likely to be associated 
with change in information environment due to Clause 49. Estimating the following specification, 
we evaluate whether and how our measures of financing changes for domestic (NCL) firms when 
the rule is strictly implemented: 
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡                                        (1) 
TD takes on value equal to 1 for period 2006-2008 and 0 for 1996-2000. The value of TD 
is chosen as such to allow us to strictly compare the difference between the timeline when Clause 
49 was non-existent to the point when it was strictly enforced. It is said that no enforcement is as 
good as no rule. The strict enforcement of these rules came into effect from January 2006, allowing 
firms to strategize their position according to the changed rule and adjust to it. This enables us to 
get a clearer picture of how Clause 49 affected Indian firms. Controlling for other factors, the 
positive and significant coefficient of TD represents an increase in Y in the post period due to the 
rule change.  
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Further, we include a group dummy (GD) for sub sample of firms and an interaction term 
of the GD with TD that allows us to predict and compare the change for one group of firms with 
other. In terms of the level asymmetry from the lowest to highest in the pre-reform period, we rank 
CL<NCL_Large<NCL_Small <NA. We hypothesize that the lower the asymmetry, the lower is 
the expected impact of the reform in the post-reform period. We choose four group dummies each 
of which is set to 1 if firm belongs to a subset of higher level of information asymmetry and it is 
set to 0 if firms belong to subset of lower information asymmetry level. The definition of all group 
dummies is included in Appendix 1. Models including GDs are explained below. 
We believe that firms listed on similar or better stock exchanges than India would need to 
comply with even stricter disclosure requirements. As such, Clause 49 would not cause much 
change to their disclosure practices. We use CL_NCL (CL_NCLLarge) as group dummy set to 1 
for NCL firms (NCL-Large firms) and 0 for CL firms. The regression model using this dummy is 
shown in equation (2) and (3). It helps us analyze the effect of Clause 49 and document the changes 
from pre-reform to post reform period across NCL-Large/NCL and CL firms. Equation (4) models 
the comparison between NCL-Large and NCL-Small firms. We expect smaller firms to be 
information asymmetric in the pre-period and hence expect larger effects of transparency on such 
firms with respect to large-sized firms. We choose the dummy Large_Small to be 1 for NCL-Small 
firms and 0 for NCL_Large firms. A similar comparison can be done on treated group of firms that 
were subject to Clause 49 (NCL firms) and control groups of firms that were not subject to the rule 
change (EF firms). Equation (5) allows us to analyze the effect of Clause 49 and document the 
changes from pre-reform to post reform across firms subjected to Clause 49 and firms waived from 
the same.   
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In terms of the level asymmetry from the lowest to highest in the pre-reform period, we 
rank CL<NCL_Large<NCL_Small <EF. We hypothesize that the lower the asymmetry, the lower 
is the expected impact of the reform in the post-reform period. So, we expect NCL firms (both 
NCL_Large and NCL_Small) to resort to financing behavior as depicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
We do not make any prediction about the financing behavior of EF firms or CL firms, except that 
their after-reform behavior is not likely to be different from their behavior in the pre-reform period.  
The basic empirical model testing the hypothesis is as per the following:  
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐴_𝑁𝐶𝐿 +  𝛼3(𝑁𝐴_𝑁𝐶𝐿 ∗ 𝑇𝐷) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (2) 
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐿_𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 +  𝛼3(𝐶𝐿_𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝐷) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3)  
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒_𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 +  𝛼3(𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒_𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑇𝐷) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4) 
𝑌 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐹_𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 +  𝛼3(𝐸𝐹_𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑇𝐷) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5)   
The above models are fixed effect regressions using industry fixed effects to control for 
the differences in other characteristics between the sample and control groups. Y is the firms’ 
sources of financing. TD is the dummy variable, set to 1 in the post reform period and 0 in the pre-
reform period. The term µ𝑖 denotes industry fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. The coefficient 
α1 will capture the effect of transparency on financing variable (Y) by comparing the average change 
over time i.e pre-clause to post-clause for the control group10. Sum of coefficients (𝛼1 + 𝛼3) will 
capture similar difference (pre to post) in Y for the treatment group. The coefficient 𝛼3 of the 
interaction term will capture the effect on Y by comparing the average change over time in the 
treatment group as compared to control group.  
                                                          
10 Coefficient α1 in equation 2(5) captures difference for CL(EF) firms. Likewise, coefficient 𝛼1 + 𝛼3 in equation 
2(5) captures difference for NCL-Large (NCL-Small) firms. 
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𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control variables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term in models represented by 
equations 1 through 5. In the basic specification, the model includes the following variables. To 
control for changes at the firm-level, capital expenditure is used as a measure of gross-investment, 
log of total assets to control for firm’s size, Cash flow from operations is controlled for as a 
measure of liquidity and Sales growth to control for firms’ growth opportunities. Alternatively, 
Earnings before depreciation interest and taxes is used instead of Cash flows and Market -to-Book 
ratio is used instead of Sales Growth.11  To control for changes in the risk associated with firm’s 
stock over time, a measure of volatility in earnings (STDROA) is included. An indicator variable, 
Classdummy is used to control for whether firm belong to an Indian Business Group (IBG) or a 
stand-alone firm. Classdummy is set to 1 for firms in Indian Business Groups and 0 for stand-alone 
firms. The regression model also includes GDP and Interest rates to control for macro-economic 
changes. To control for any differences in raising finances over boom period in India and to capture 
any industry-specific effect on financing decisions, we include industry dummies in the analysis.  
The result for fixed effect regression is shown in Table 4 and discussed below. Panel A 
shows results for all firms, panel B(C) compares the level of financing between NCL(NCL-Large) 
and CL firms, panel D compares between NCL-Large and NCL-Small firms. In each panel, there 
are three columns where column 1, 2 and 3 illustrates results for TBorrEq, TBondEq and RE/Exfin 
respectively12.   
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Results for alternate specifications are not shown in the paper for the brevity of the paper. The result remains the 
same as of basic specification shown in the paper.  
12 We also perform one regression comparing entire NCL firms against CL (as equation 4) firms and another 
comparing NCL firms against EF firms (as equation 5). Results for equation 4 is similar to equation 2 while that of 
equation 5 is similar to equation 3 respectively.  
24 
 
Table 4 : Estimating level of financing 
The table represents results for level of financing measures using Fixed effects regression model. 
The sample includes 1280 firms across the years1996-2008. There are 4 panels in this table. Panel 
A presents all firms as a sample; panel B compares CL firms to NCL firms; Panel C compares CL 
firms to NCL_Large firms; Panel D compares NCL_Large firms to NCL_Small firms. There are 3 
columns in all these panels. The dependent financial variables (1) TBorrEq defined as external 
financing from all possible sources and measured as sum of borrowing and equity is shown in 
column 1, (2) TBondEq defined as market based financing and measured as sum of public 
borrowing and equity is shown in column 2, and (3) RE/TBorrEq defined as ratio of internal 
financing to external financing and measured as Retained Earnings over TBorrEq is shown in 
column 3 respectively.  
TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause 
period (1996-2000). CL_NCLLarge(CL_NCL) is the indicator variable with value 1 for 
NCL_Large firms(NCL) and 0 for CL firms. Large_Small is the indicator variable set to 1 for NCL-
Small firms and 0 for NCL_Large firms. NA_NCLSmall is the dummy with value 1 for NCL-Small 
firms and 0 for EF firms. Interaction term shown in all columns captures the effect on Y by 
comparing the average change over time in the treatment firm as compared to the control firms. 
Other control variables are explained below.  
Classdummy is an indicator variable with value equal to 1 for firms belonging to Indian Business 
groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. Size is measured as log of total assets, Capex is the gross 
investment measured as change in gross fixed asset plus assets sales deflated by total assets. Cash 
Flow is sum of profit after tax and depreciation of the firm deflated by total assets. Salesgrowth 
change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). STDROA is obtained from 5 years 
rolling standard deviation for variable Profits before depreciation, interest and taxes. Interest Rate 
is the annual prime lending rate in India and GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for 
Indian economy, both data fetched from World Bank. All firm level data is obtained from CMIE-
Prowess database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
table 4 continued 
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Panel A: Fixed effects for all firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0623*** 0.00773* 0.00345 
 (0.00864) (0.00467) (0.00871) 
Size -0.0618*** -0.0485*** 0.0422*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00178) (0.00331) 
Capex -0.184*** -0.214*** 0.284*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0249) (0.0466) 
Cash Flow -0.708*** -0.149*** 0.592*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0157) (0.0287) 
Sales Growth -0.0163 0.000993 0.0147 
 (0.0104) (0.00560) (0.0104) 
STDROA 0.0000165*** 0.0000149*** -0.0000121*** 
 (0.00000337) (0.00000182) (0.00000336) 
GDP 0.00213 0.000470 -0.00396* 
 (0.00210) (0.00113) (0.00211) 
Interest Rate -0.00329 -0.00255 -0.00285 
 (0.00597) (0.00322) (0.00600) 
Class Type -0.0120 0.00615 -0.0586*** 
 (0.0101) (0.00543) (0.0102) 
Constant 0.994*** 0.594*** -0.193** 
 (0.0913) (0.0493) (0.0918) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7166 7166 6852 
Adjusted R2 0.2373 0.2222 0.1462 
 
 
 
 
 
table 4 continued  
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Panel B: Fixed effects CL Vs. NCL firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.145*** -0.136*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0266) (0.0502) 
CL_NCL -0.187*** -0.190*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0185) (0.0354) 
TD*CL_NCL 0.229*** 0.159*** -0.221*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0268) (0.0508) 
Size -0.0840*** -0.0687*** 0.0567*** 
 (0.00365) (0.00191) (0.00359) 
Capex -0.178*** -0.204*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0250) (0.0475) 
CashFlow -0.687*** -0.139*** 0.558*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0154) (0.0285) 
Salesgrowth -0.0266** -0.00345 0.0310*** 
 (0.0112) (0.00585) (0.0109) 
STDROA 0.0000202*** 0.0000162*** -0.0000142*** 
 (0.00000362) (0.00000190) (0.00000352) 
GDP 0.00219 0.000532 -0.00395* 
 (0.00218) (0.00114) (0.00214) 
InterestRate -0.00297 -0.000739 -0.00171 
 (0.00621) (0.00325) (0.00611) 
ClassType 0.0157 0.0325*** -0.0780*** 
 (0.0108) (0.00568) (0.0107) 
Constant 1.408*** 0.936*** -0.494*** 
 (0.104) (0.0546) (0.103) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6491 6491 6215 
Adjusted R2 0.2679 0.2978 0.1653 
 
table 4 continued 
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Panel C: Fixed effects CL Vs. NCL-Large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.125*** -0.118*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0258) (0.0500) 
CL_NCLLarge -0.148*** -0.128*** 0.145*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0187) (0.0367) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.207*** 0.133*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0263) (0.0509) 
Size -0.0820*** -0.0509*** 0.0536*** 
 (0.00517) (0.00282) (0.00545) 
Capex -0.169*** -0.198*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0314) (0.0617) 
CashFlow -0.742*** -0.182*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0188) (0.0358) 
Salesgrowth -0.0174 0.00440 0.0477*** 
 (0.0148) (0.00807) (0.0156) 
STDROA 0.0000159*** 0.00000947*** -0.0000124*** 
 (0.00000351) (0.00000192) (0.00000365) 
GDP 0.000779 0.000677 -0.00338 
 (0.00266) (0.00145) (0.00280) 
InterestRate -0.00250 0.00197 -0.00245 
 (0.00750) (0.00410) (0.00791) 
ClassType -0.0351*** 0.0144* -0.0601*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00735) (0.0142) 
Constant 1.400*** 0.713*** -0.372*** 
 (0.127) (0.0690) (0.134) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3741 3741 3568 
Adjusted R2 0.2957 0.2140 0.1756 
 
table 4 continued  
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Panel D: Fixed effects NCL Large Vs. NCL Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0862*** 0.0269*** -0.00295 
 (0.0121) (0.00622) (0.0121) 
Large_Small -0.168*** -0.106*** 0.0980*** 
 (0.0145) (0.00747) (0.0146) 
TD*Large_Small 0.0262 0.00993 -0.0611*** 
 (0.0171) (0.00881) (0.0171) 
Size -0.130*** -0.1000*** 0.0754*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00239) (0.00461) 
Capex -0.136*** -0.172*** 0.239*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0248) (0.0483) 
CashFlow -0.691*** -0.144*** 0.559*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0151) (0.0287) 
Salesgrowth -0.0243** -0.00226 0.0298*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00573) (0.0110) 
STDROA 0.000131*** 0.0000962*** -0.0000479*** 
 (0.0000110) (0.00000566) (0.0000108) 
GDP 0.00208 0.000446 -0.00363* 
 (0.00220) (0.00113) (0.00218) 
InterestRate -0.00514 -0.00169 -0.000331 
 (0.00627) (0.00323) (0.00623) 
ClassType -0.00471 0.0199*** -0.0698*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00568) (0.0111) 
Constant 1.614*** 1.002*** -0.482*** 
 (0.1000) (0.0514) (0.0995) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6298 6298 6034 
Adjusted R2 0.2915 0.3460 0.1737 
 
table 4 continued 
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Panel E: Fixed effects NCL-Small Vs. EF firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0959*** 0.0871*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0116) (0.0273) 
NA_NCLSmall 0.247*** 0.227*** -0.0336 
 (0.0201) (0.00897) (0.0212) 
TD*NA_NCLSmall 0.00689 -0.0466*** -0.143*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0126) (0.0297) 
Size -0.193*** -0.161*** 0.101*** 
 (0.00712) (0.00318) (0.00739) 
Capex -0.0297 -0.0799*** 0.328*** 
 (0.0671) (0.0300) (0.0696) 
CashFlow -0.650*** -0.109*** 0.582*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0201) (0.0460) 
Salesgrowth -0.0188 -0.00424 -0.00794 
 (0.0133) (0.00594) (0.0137) 
STDROA 0.00143*** 0.000918*** -0.000820*** 
 (0.000102) (0.0000457) (0.000105) 
GDP 0.00332 -0.0000741 -0.00407 
 (0.00294) (0.00131) (0.00306) 
InterestRate 0.00231 0.000196 -0.00210 
 (0.00846) (0.00379) (0.00881) 
ClassType 0.00166 -0.00250 -0.0529*** 
 (0.0147) (0.00656) (0.0155) 
Constant 1.333*** 0.964*** -0.528*** 
 (0.131) (0.0584) (0.136) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3425 3425 3284 
Adjusted R2 0.3456 0.5635 0.1818 
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Consistent with the hypothesis, column 1 in panel A shows that TBorrEq is positive and 
significant for all firms. It implies that there is a significant increase in the total external financing 
of firms measured as a percentage of total assets. The result is significant at 1% level of 
significance. Column 1 in panel B depicts that TBorrEq increases significantly for non-cross-listed 
firms while it decreases for cross listed firms when compared from pre-clause period to post clause 
period.13 This is consistent with our hypothesis that after-reform behavior for cross listed firms is 
not expected to be different from their behavior in the pre-reform period. However, it is the 
coefficient of the interaction term α3 that is of particular interest to us. It denotes the difference 
over time in the average difference of financing measure in the two group of firms. A positive and 
significant interaction term implies that the increase in total external financing for NCL firms from 
pre to post is significantly higher than that for CL firms.  
Column 2 in each panel illustrates results for market based external financing TBondEq. 
Panel A shows that TBondEq increases significantly for all firms. Panel B/C shows that TBondEq 
increases for NCL/NCL-Large firm14 respectively while it decreases for CL firms. The interaction 
term is positive and significant indicating an increase in TBondEq for NCL/NCL-Large firms with 
respect to CL firms in the post period.  
Column 3 in each panel represents regression for financing measure RE/Exfin. Panel B 
shows that the ratio of internal to external financing decreases for NCL firms15 in the post reform 
period. It suggests that internal financing (numerator) increases (since external financing is 
increasing), causing RE/Exfin to decrease. The interaction term in panels B and C is negative and 
                                                          
13Column 1 in Panel B:  𝛼1 = -0.125 (significant) and Coefficient 𝛼1 + 𝛼3 =0.207 – 0.125 = 0.082 (significant).   
Significance of sum of coefficient is tested using t-test. 
14 Column 2 in Panel B:  𝛼1 = -0.118 (significant) and Coefficient 𝛼1 + 𝛼3 =0.133– 0.118 = 0.015 (significant).   
Significance of sum of coefficient is tested using t-test. 
15 Sum of coefficients: 𝛼1 + 𝛼3 =0.199– 0.221 = -0.22 (negative and significant)  
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significant showing a relative decrease in the RE/Exfin of NCL/NCL_Large firms as compared to 
CL firms. Panel D demonstrates that the ratio of internal to external financing decreases for both 
NCL-Small and NCL-Large firms in the post reform period. However,  as information asymmetry 
is expected to be higher in smaller firms and hence we expect the increase in external funding to be 
higher relative to internal funding. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that NCL-Small firms 
subject to reform increased their external capital more relative to internal capital. The change was 
higher for NCL-Small firms, relative to NCL_Large firms. 
Analysing the control variables in all panels of Table 4, the result further indicates that 
bigger firms have less TBondEq and TBorrEq but higher Ratio. Firms incurring high capital 
expenditure have less external capital and more retained earnings. Firms with high volatility in 
internal cash flows raise more external funding and retains less. Industry characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables like GDP growth and prime lending rate do not impact external financing 
raised by firms. Thus, we conclude that higher disclosure mandated through Clause 49 does 
translate into higher external financing for firms subjected to the rule change.  
The results are robust to alternate proxy for liquidity and sales growth of firms. For each 
column in each panel of Table 4, we find similar results after replacing CashFlow (cash flow from 
operations) with EBDITA (operating income) and sales growth with M_B (market to book ratio). 
Operating income is the firms’ sales minus total operating cost, before depreciation and 
amortization, and is measured relative to total assets of the firm. Market to book ratio is the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity. All our results remain unchanged with these 
proxies. We find that TBorrEq, TBondEq increases more for NCL firms as compared to CL firms 
while Ratio decreases more for NCL firms as compared to CL firms.  
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Further, we use Tobit model instead of fixed effect to account for the fact that the dependent 
variable is truncated and thus OLS may be mis-specified. We cannot have financing variable less 
than 0 or greater than 100 because of the scaled dependent variables. The results we get including 
Tobit model is qualitatively similar to the fixed effect regression result.  
To conclude, it follows that there is an increasing reliance on total external financing 
among domestic listed Indian firms relative to the cross-listed firms in the post reform period.  
Table 5 : Estimating level of financing 
The table represents results for level of financing measures using Tobit model. The variables being 
scaled variables are truncated at 0 at the lower limit and at 1 at the higher level. The sample 
includes 1280 firms across the years1996-2008. There are 4 panels in this table. Panel A presents 
all firms as a sample; panel B compares CL firms to NCL firms; Panel C compares CL firms to 
NCL_Large firms; Panel D compares NCL_Large firms to NCL_Small firms. There are 3 columns 
in all these panels. The dependent financial variables (1) TBorrEq defined as external financing 
from all possible sources and measured as sum of borrowing and equity is shown in column 1, (2) 
TBondEq defined as market based financing and measured as sum of public borrowing and equity 
is shown in column 2, and (3) RE/TBorrEq defined as ratio of internal financing to external 
financing and measured as Retained Earnings over TBorrEq is shown in column 3 respectively.  
TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause 
period (1996-2000). CL_NCLLarge(CL_NCL) is the indicator variable with value 1 for 
NCL_Large firms(NCL) and 0 for CL firms. Large_Small is the indicator variable set to 1 for NCL-
Small firms and 0 for NCL_Large firms. NA_NCLSmall is the dummy with value 1 for NCL-Small 
firms and 0 for EF firms. Interaction term shown in all columns captures the effect on Y by 
comparing the average change over time in the treatment firm as compared to the control firms. 
Other control variables are explained below.  
Classdummy is an indicator variable with value equal to 1 for firms belonging to Indian Business 
groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. Size is measured as log of total assets, Capex is the gross 
investment measured as change in gross fixed asset plus assets sales deflated by total assets. Cash 
Flow is sum of profit after tax and depreciation of the firm deflated by total assets. Salesgrowth 
change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). STDROA is obtained from 5 years 
rolling standard deviation for variable Profits before depreciation, interest and taxes. Interest Rate 
is the annual prime lending rate in India and GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for 
Indian economy, both data fetched from World Bank. All firm level data is obtained from CMIE-
Prowess database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Panel A: Fixed effects for all firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0623*** 0.00773* 0.0705*** 
 (0.00861) (0.00465) (0.00771) 
Size -0.0618*** -0.0485*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00177) (0.00292) 
Capex -0.184*** -0.214*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0248) (0.0409) 
CashFlow -0.708*** -0.149*** 0.828*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0156) (0.0370) 
Salesgrowth -0.0163 0.000993 -0.00808 
 (0.0103) (0.00558) (0.00982) 
STDROA 0.0000165*** 0.0000149*** -0.00000883*** 
 (0.00000335) (0.00000181) (0.00000285) 
GDP 0.00213 0.000470 -0.00267 
 (0.00209) (0.00113) (0.00184) 
InterestRate -0.00329 -0.00255 0.00236 
 (0.00594) (0.00321) (0.00525) 
ClassType -0.0120 0.00615 -0.0321*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00541) (0.00895) 
Constant 0.994*** 0.594*** -0.160** 
 (0.0909) (0.0491) (0.0806) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7166 7166 6852 
Pseudo R2 0.2973 -0.8298 0.2412 
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Panel B: Fixed effects CL Vs. NCL firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.145*** -0.136*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0264) (0.0433) 
CL_NCL -0.187*** -0.190*** 0.135*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0184) (0.0308) 
TD*CL_NCL 0.229*** 0.159*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0267) (0.0437) 
Size -0.0840*** -0.0687*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.00363) (0.00190) (0.00321) 
Capex -0.178*** -0.204*** 0.0725* 
 (0.0476) (0.0249) (0.0418) 
CashFlow -0.687*** -0.139*** 0.785*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0153) (0.0371) 
Salesgrowth -0.0266** -0.00345 0.00357 
 (0.0111) (0.00582) (0.0105) 
STDROA 0.0000202*** 0.0000162*** -0.0000103*** 
 (0.00000361) (0.00000189) (0.00000300) 
GDP 0.00219 0.000532 -0.00253 
 (0.00217) (0.00114) (0.00188) 
InterestRate -0.00297 -0.000739 0.00351 
 (0.00618) (0.00324) (0.00537) 
ClassType 0.0157 0.0325*** -0.0464*** 
 (0.0108) (0.00565) (0.00950) 
Constant 1.408*** 0.936*** -0.395*** 
 (0.104) (0.0543) (0.0908) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6491 6491 6215 
Pseudo R2 0.3354 -1.2341 0.2700 
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Panel C: Fixed effects CL Vs. NCL-Large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.125*** -0.118*** 0.192*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0256) (0.0444) 
CL_NCLLarge -0.148*** -0.128*** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0185) (0.0329) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.207*** 0.133*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0261) (0.0453) 
Size -0.0820*** -0.0509*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.00513) (0.00280) (0.00502) 
Capex -0.169*** -0.198*** 0.0465 
 (0.0571) (0.0312) (0.0555) 
CashFlow -0.742*** -0.182*** 1.022*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0187) (0.0570) 
Salesgrowth -0.0174 0.00440 0.00836 
 (0.0147) (0.00801) (0.0151) 
STDROA 0.0000159*** 0.00000947*** -0.0000100*** 
 (0.00000348) (0.00000190) (0.00000321) 
GDP 0.000779 0.000677 -0.00252 
 (0.00264) (0.00144) (0.00251) 
InterestRate -0.00250 0.00197 0.000973 
 (0.00745) (0.00407) (0.00710) 
ClassType -0.0351*** 0.0144** -0.0424*** 
 (0.0134) (0.00729) (0.0129) 
Constant 1.400*** 0.713*** -0.260** 
 (0.126) (0.0685) (0.121) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3741 3741 3568 
Pseudo R2 0.4318 -0.5357 0.3224 
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Panel D: Fixed effects NCL Large Vs. NCL Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
    
TD 0.0862*** 0.0269*** 0.0667*** 
 (0.0120) (0.00619) (0.0107) 
Large_Small -0.168*** -0.106*** 0.0395*** 
 (0.0145) (0.00744) (0.0131) 
TD*Large_Small 0.0262 0.00993 -0.0353** 
 (0.0170) (0.00876) (0.0151) 
Size -0.130*** -0.1000*** 0.0387*** 
 (0.00463) (0.00238) (0.00419) 
Capex -0.136*** -0.172*** 0.0803* 
 (0.0479) (0.0246) (0.0426) 
CashFlow -0.691*** -0.144*** 0.790*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0150) (0.0379) 
Salesgrowth -0.0243** -0.00226 0.00318 
 (0.0111) (0.00570) (0.0106) 
STDROA 0.000131*** 0.0000962*** -0.0000223** 
 (0.0000110) (0.00000563) (0.00000927) 
GDP 0.00208 0.000446 -0.00233 
 (0.00219) (0.00113) (0.00192) 
InterestRate -0.00514 -0.00169 0.00408 
 (0.00624) (0.00321) (0.00549) 
ClassType -0.00471 0.0199*** -0.0458*** 
 (0.0110) (0.00565) (0.00981) 
Constant 1.614*** 1.002*** -0.332*** 
 (0.0995) (0.0512) (0.0885) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6298 6298 6034 
Pseudo R2 0.3630 -1.5842 0.2722 
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Panel E: Fixed effects NCL-Small Vs. EF firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0959*** 0.0871*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0115) (0.0230) 
NA_NCLSmall 0.247*** 0.227*** -0.0560*** 
 (0.0199) (0.00890) (0.0180) 
TD*NA_NCLSmall 0.00689 -0.0466*** -0.0638** 
 (0.0280) (0.0125) (0.0250) 
Size -0.193*** -0.161*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.00706) (0.00316) (0.00658) 
Capex -0.0297 -0.0799*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0298) (0.0597) 
CashFlow -0.650*** -0.109*** 0.694*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0199) (0.0491) 
Salesgrowth -0.0188 -0.00424 -0.0186 
 (0.0132) (0.00589) (0.0127) 
STDROA 0.00143*** 0.000918*** -0.000449*** 
 (0.000101) (0.0000453) (0.0000884) 
GDP 0.00332 -0.0000741 -0.00256 
 (0.00291) (0.00130) (0.00261) 
InterestRate 0.00231 0.000196 0.00381 
 (0.00839) (0.00375) (0.00755) 
ClassType 0.00166 -0.00250 -0.0269** 
 (0.0145) (0.00651) (0.0133) 
Constant 1.333*** 0.964*** -0.347*** 
 (0.129) (0.0579) (0.117) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3425 3425 3284 
Pseudo R2 0.4321 -4.6022 0.2713 
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5.2.3. Controlling for endogeneity and self-selection 
The potential endogeneity in our analysis lies in the fact that both capital and investment 
could be affected by same firm-specific and economy-wide variables, and so they may not remain 
truly exogenous to each other. Hence, OLS estimates may not be reliable. To control for 
endogeneity that could arise due to bidirectional causality, we estimate a 2-stage least square 
(2SLS) estimation.  Another potential bias the sample is likely to suffer from is “self-selection”. 
The literature on investment argues that high investment firms are the ones that raise high capital.  
If this bias exists, then the increase in financing documented in earlier section may be partly driven 
by the self-selection of high investment firms raising higher capital. The 2SLS estimation does 
control for generic endogeneity that arises from simultaneous determination of capital and 
investment, however, it still does not address the self-selection bias.  For this, we incorporate a 2-
stage Heckman correction model in our analysis.  
We estimate the two stages of 2SLS and Heckman estimation following Alhenawi and 
Krishnaswami (2015). For both 2SLS and Heckman estimation, first stage is a fixed effect 
regression of investment in year prior to the year of the capital analysis. The difference lies in 2nd 
stage equation. The predicted value of investment from the first stage regression is used as a control 
in the second-stage regression of 2SLS estimation. The second stage regression in Heckman 
correction analysis controls the biases for the self-selection by including inverse mills ratio from 
stage 1.  
The specification of first equation is:  
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 +  
𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑞𝑖𝑡−1+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
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Table 6 : First stage estimation for 2 SLS/Heckman correction using fixed effects 
This table represents first stage fixed effect regression of 2SLS/Heckman correction for predicting 
capital expenditure in the years prior to raising capital. The sample includes 1260 firms over the 
period 2006-2008 obtained from CMIE-Prowess database. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditures in the year (t-1) in Panel A. Column 1 represents OLS results while column 2 
represents results for logit regression with Capex as dependent variable. TD is the dummy variable 
with value 1 in post clause period (1996-1998) and 0 in the pre-clause period (1996-2000). Size is 
measured as log of total assets in the year (t-1). Cash Flow is sum of profit after tax and 
depreciation of the firm in the year (t-1). Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided 
by sales in year (t-1). Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for Indian Business groups 
and 0 for stand-alone firms. TBorrEq is the total funds raised from external market in the year t-1. 
GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian economy in the year (t-1) data fetched 
from World Bank. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: First Stage OLS regression for capital expenditure in the prior year.  
 Fixed Effects Tobit 
 Capex Capex 
TD -0.0204*** -0.582 
 (0.0000) (0.523) 
CashFlow 0.0144 0.470 
 (0.0612) (0.462) 
Size 0.00977*** 0.400*** 
 (0.0000) (0.119) 
Salesgrowth 0.0327*** 0.307 
 (0.0000) (0.196) 
ClassType -0.0120*** 0.722** 
 (0.0000) (0.341) 
GDP 0.00203 0.199* 
 (0.0516) (0.116) 
TBorrEq -0.0132*** -1.516*** 
 (0.0000) (0.194) 
Constant -0.00236 2.292* 
 (0.8321) (1.377) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 6718 6160 
Adjusted R2 0.0823 0.2711 
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The estimation for capex is controlled for firm specific variables a (total external capital, 
size, sales-growth, cashflow), industry specific (IBG or standalone) and economy-wide variables 
(GDP and Interest Rate). The term µ𝑖 denotes industry fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The result from first stage indicates that bigger firms with high growth opportunities and 
are likely to incur higher capital expenditure. Firms generating high cash flows are likely to invest 
more.  Stand-alone firms are likely to have higher capital expenditure as compared to firms 
belonging to Indian Business group. Large sized firms in terms of total assets and firms with high 
investment opportunities end up investing higher in the post period. Industry characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables like GDP growth positively affect the chances of investment. However, 
inconsistent with the extant literature on the endogeneity biases, firms with high amount of external 
financing are likely to have less capital expenditure.  
We now study the factors that affect the financing decisions of a manager using pooled 
OLS regression in stage 2. The predicted value of investment from the first stage regression is used 
as a control in the second-stage regression of 2SLS estimation.  
Column 1 in each panel illustrates results for TBorrEq. Positive and significant value of 
TD in panel A illustrates that total external financing increases for all firms in the post period. Panel 
B (C) indicates that TBorrEq increases significantly for NCL (NCL-Large firms) while it decreases 
significantly for CL firms. Positive and significant interaction term proves result to be consistent 
with the hypothesis. The results further indicate that low investment firms are the ones raising more 
funds externally. Bigger firms with and high liquidity in terms of cash flow from operations, raise 
less external capital and retain more. Stand-alone firms seem to be raising more and retaining more 
too as compared to IBG firms.  
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Table 7 : Second stage 2SLS regression 
Second Stage OLS regression for change in measures of financing from pre to post period. Fitted 
value represents the predicted value from first stage OLS regression in stage 1 and is used as 
control for capital expenditure. The table has 5 panels representing and comparing different sub-
group of firms. There are three columns in each panel showing results for TBorrEq, TBondEq and 
Ratio respectively. Panel A represents entire sample; financing measures are compared across CL 
and NCL firms in panel B, CL and NCL_Large in panel C, NCL_Large Vs. NCL-Small in panel D 
and EF Vs. NCL_Small in panel E.  
TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause 
period (1996-2000). CL_NCLLarge(CL_NCL) is the indicator variable with value 1 for 
NCL_Large firms(NCL) and 0 for CL firms. Large_Small is the indicator variable set to 1 for NCL-
Small firms and 0 for NCL_Large firms. NA_NCLSmall is the dummy with value 1 for NCL-Small 
firms and 0 for EF firms. Interaction term shown in all columns captures the effect on Y by 
comparing the average change over time in the treatment firm as compared to the control firms. 
Other control variables are explained below. Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash Flow is 
sum of profit after tax and depreciation of the firm. EBDITA is the profits before depreciation, 
interest and taxes. Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). 
M_B is market to book ratio. Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for Indian Business 
groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian 
economy, both data fetched from World Bank. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The 
symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Panel A: Regression result for All firms as sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0354*** -0.00409 0.0217** 
 (0.00964) (0.00511) (0.00958) 
Fitted values -3.031*** -1.379*** 2.647*** 
 (0.205) (0.109) (0.203) 
Size -0.0371*** -0.0394*** 0.0224*** 
 (0.00402) (0.00213) (0.00399) 
CashFlow -0.713*** -0.144*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0162) (0.0298) 
STDROA 0.0000133*** 0.0000153*** -0.00000892*** 
 (0.00000347) (0.00000184) (0.00000341) 
InterestRate 0.00555 0.00109 -0.00105 
 (0.00753) (0.00400) (0.00744) 
GDP -0.00472* -0.00254* 0.00430* 
 (0.00251) (0.00133) (0.00248) 
ClassType -0.0438*** -0.0109* -0.0260** 
 (0.0108) (0.00575) (0.0108) 
Constant 1.116*** 0.636*** -0.303*** 
 (0.108) (0.0574) (0.107) 
Observations 6451 6451 6179 
Adjusted R2 0.1967 0.1978 0.1344 
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Panel B: CL Vs. NCL firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.142** -0.136*** 0.197*** 
 (0.0567) (0.0292) (0.0557) 
CL_NCL -0.182*** -0.213*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0211) (0.0405) 
TD*CL_NCL 0.197*** 0.147*** -0.199*** 
 (0.0574) (0.0295) (0.0563) 
Fitted values -3.162*** -1.426*** 2.622*** 
 (0.213) (0.109) (0.208) 
Size -0.0598*** -0.0597*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00225) (0.00427) 
CashFlow -0.692*** -0.137*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0158) (0.0296) 
STDROA 0.0000171*** 0.0000158*** -0.0000107*** 
 (0.00000369) (0.00000189) (0.00000355) 
InterestRate 0.00692 0.00294 -0.00123 
 (0.00779) (0.00400) (0.00757) 
GDP -0.00484* -0.00262** 0.00399 
 (0.00260) (0.00133) (0.00253) 
ClassType -0.0154 0.0171*** -0.0478*** 
 (0.0115) (0.00593) (0.0113) 
Constant 1.448*** 0.966*** -0.562*** 
 (0.120) (0.0619) (0.117) 
Observations 5856 5856 5617 
Adjusted R2 0.2387 0.2845 0.1529 
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Panel C: CL Vs. NCL-Large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.126** -0.125*** 0.191*** 
 (0.0544) (0.0288) (0.0561) 
CL_NCLLarge -0.161*** -0.160*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0214) (0.0420) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.186*** 0.131*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0294) (0.0573) 
Fitted values -2.406*** -1.340*** 2.437*** 
 (0.274) (0.145) (0.283) 
Size -0.0660*** -0.0437*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.00621) (0.00329) (0.00638) 
CashFlow -0.758*** -0.178*** 0.617*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0199) (0.0381) 
STDROA 0.0000147*** 0.0000107*** -0.00000943*** 
 (0.00000360) (0.00000191) (0.00000365) 
InterestRate 0.0104 0.00425 -0.00545 
 (0.0100) (0.00530) (0.0102) 
GDP -0.00237 -0.00209 0.00255 
 (0.00333) (0.00176) (0.00342) 
ClassType -0.0654*** -0.00522 -0.0248 
 (0.0147) (0.00776) (0.0151) 
Constant 1.432*** 0.805*** -0.505*** 
 (0.154) (0.0815) (0.158) 
Observations 3295 3295 3147 
Adjusted R2 0.2366 0.1732 0.1517 
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Panel D: NCL-Large Vs. NCL-Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0598*** 0.0198*** 0.0168 
 (0.0134) (0.00675) (0.0133) 
Large_Small -0.185*** -0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0163) (0.00821) (0.0162) 
TD*Large_Small 0.0236 0.00257 -0.0582*** 
 (0.0188) (0.00948) (0.0187) 
Fitted values -3.079*** -1.329*** 2.603*** 
 (0.215) (0.108) (0.213) 
Size -0.110*** -0.0944*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.00542) (0.00273) (0.00535) 
CashFlow -0.692*** -0.139*** 0.569*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0154) (0.0298) 
STDROA 0.000129*** 0.0000983*** -0.0000525*** 
 (0.0000115) (0.00000580) (0.0000112) 
InterestRate 0.00715 0.00337 -0.00140 
 (0.00781) (0.00394) (0.00770) 
GDP -0.00425 -0.00217* 0.00390 
 (0.00261) (0.00131) (0.00257) 
ClassType -0.0383*** 0.00425 -0.0357*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00587) (0.0116) 
Constant 1.667*** 1.017*** -0.570*** 
 (0.115) (0.0580) (0.113) 
Observations 5690 5690 5460 
Adjusted R2 0.2674 0.3394 0.1602 
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Panel E: NCL-Small Vs. EF firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0847*** 0.0841*** 0.0913*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0126) (0.0299) 
NA_NCLSmall 0.284*** 0.239*** -0.0477** 
 (0.0225) (0.00996) (0.0239) 
TD*NA_NCLSmall -0.00901 -0.0521*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0137) (0.0325) 
Fitted values -3.183*** -0.944*** 2.607*** 
 (0.275) (0.122) (0.286) 
Size -0.162*** -0.154*** 0.0862*** 
 (0.00783) (0.00347) (0.00814) 
CashFlow -0.664*** -0.112*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0452) (0.0200) (0.0465) 
STDROA 0.00133*** 0.000871*** -0.000774*** 
 (0.0000966) (0.0000428) (0.0000994) 
InterestRate 0.00664 0.00381 0.00121 
 (0.0101) (0.00446) (0.0105) 
GDP -0.00613* -0.00223 0.00520 
 (0.00337) (0.00149) (0.00351) 
ClassType -0.0116 -0.00817 -0.0312** 
 (0.0149) (0.00662) (0.0157) 
Constant 1.486*** 0.952*** -0.597*** 
 (0.147) (0.0651) (0.153) 
Observations 3156 3156 3032 
Adjusted R2 0.3254 0.5560 0.1652 
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The second stage regression in Heckman correction analysis controls the biases for the self-
selection by including inverse mills ratio from stage 1. Table 8 present the results of this model. 
The significantly positive value of the inverse mills ratio in the second equation suggest 
endogeneity between capital and investment. Total external financing as measured by TBorrEq is 
shown in column 1 of each panel. Positive and significant values of TD in panel A and that of 
interaction terms in panels B and C indicates that external financing increases even after controlling 
for endogeneity. We find that results are qualitatively similar even after controlling for the 
endogeneity of investment and capital, and the self-selection of high-investment firms in the high-
capital sub-sample.  
Table 8 : Second Stage Heckman Correction 
This table presents HECKMAN second OLS regression of the pooled financial variables in the 
post Clause 49 period. The dependent variables are measures of financing TBorrEq in panel A, 
TBondEq in panel B and Ratio in panel C respectively. In each panel, column 1 represents entire 
sample; financing measures are compared across CL and NCL firms in column 2, CL and 
NCL_Large in column 3, NCL_Large Vs. NCL-Small in column 4 and EF Vs. NCL_Small in 
column 5. 
TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause 
period (1996-2000). CL_NCLLarge(CL_NCL) is the indicator variable with value 1 for 
NCL_Large firms(NCL) and 0 for CL firms. Large_Small is the indicator variable set to 1 for NCL-
Small firms and 0 for NCL_Large firms. NA_NCLSmall is the dummy with value 1 for NCL-Small 
firms and 0 for EF firms. Interaction term shown in all columns captures the effect on Y by 
comparing the average change over time in the treatment firm as compared to the control firms. 
Other control variables are explained below. Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for 
Indian Business groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash 
Flow is sum of profit after tax and depreciation of the firm. EBDITA is the profits before 
depreciation, interest and taxes. Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales 
in year (t-1). M_B is market to book ratio. STDROA is obtained from 5 years rolling standard 
deviation for variable Profits before depreciation, interest and taxes. Interest Rate is the annual 
prime lending rate in India and GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian 
economy, both data sets fetched from World Bank. Inverse Mills represents the Inverse Mills Ratio 
generated from first stage model in column 1 of Table 8.  All firm level data are from CMIE-
Prowess database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
table 8 continued  
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 Panel A: Second stage Heckman Correction Results for All firms  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0347*** 0.000828 0.0105 
 (0.00902) (0.00500) (0.00956) 
Size -0.0505*** -0.0540*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.00350) (0.00194) (0.00371) 
CashFlow -0.831*** -0.198*** 0.664*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0159) (0.0299) 
STDROA 0.0000253*** 0.0000328*** -0.0000115* 
 (0.00000600) (0.00000332) (0.00000649) 
InterestRate -0.00365 -0.00264 0.00644 
 (0.00559) (0.00310) (0.00591) 
ClassType -0.0282*** 0.00458 -0.0508*** 
 (0.0103) (0.00571) (0.0109) 
InverseMills 2.175*** 0.725*** -1.168*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0345) (0.0645) 
Constant 1.073*** 0.657*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0734) (0.0407) (0.0776) 
Observations 5913 5913 5665 
Adjusted R2 0.3156 0.2576 0.1567 
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Panel B: Second stage Heckman Correction Results for CL Vs. NCL firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.166*** -0.205*** 0.137** 
 (0.0632) (0.0337) (0.0655) 
CL_NCL -0.141*** -0.207*** 0.163*** 
 (0.0446) (0.0238) (0.0469) 
TD*CL_NCL 0.219*** 0.219*** -0.150** 
 (0.0637) (0.0340) (0.0661) 
Size -0.0763*** -0.0747*** 0.0548*** 
 (0.00383) (0.00204) (0.00396) 
CashFlow -0.804*** -0.180*** 0.627*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0154) (0.0295) 
STDROA 0.0000374*** 0.0000392*** -0.0000145** 
 (0.00000654) (0.00000349) (0.00000681) 
InterestRate -0.00325 -0.00118 0.00684 
 (0.00583) (0.00311) (0.00602) 
ClassType 0.00826 0.0345*** -0.0807*** 
 (0.0111) (0.00590) (0.0115) 
InverseMills 2.066*** 0.657*** -1.089*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0344) (0.0655) 
Constant 1.382*** 0.983*** -0.539*** 
 (0.0902) (0.0481) (0.0935) 
Observations 5359 5359 5142 
Adjusted R2 0.3449 0.3368 0.1745 
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Panel C: Second stage Heckman Correction Results for CL Vs. NCL-Large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD -0.145** -0.173*** 0.127* 
 (0.0587) (0.0326) (0.0654) 
CL_NCLLarge -0.108** -0.151*** 0.121** 
 (0.0423) (0.0235) (0.0478) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.179*** 0.174*** -0.101 
 (0.0597) (0.0331) (0.0665) 
Size -0.0686*** -0.0538*** 0.0454*** 
 (0.00568) (0.00315) (0.00632) 
CashFlow -0.809*** -0.201*** 0.646*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0189) (0.0373) 
STDROA 0.0000289*** 0.0000247*** -0.00000905 
 (0.00000632) (0.00000351) (0.00000708) 
InterestRate -0.00378 -0.00154 0.00667 
 (0.00726) (0.00403) (0.00808) 
ClassType -0.0388*** 0.0151** -0.0646*** 
 (0.0138) (0.00764) (0.0154) 
InverseMills 6.817*** 2.446*** -3.400*** 
 (0.256) (0.142) (0.279) 
Constant 1.364*** 0.812*** -0.465*** 
 (0.111) (0.0616) (0.123) 
Observations 2975 2975 2838 
Adjusted R2 0.3765 0.2463 0.1747 
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Panel D: Second stage Heckman Correction Results for NCL_Large Vs. NCL-Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0657*** 0.0247*** 0.00711 
 (0.0128) (0.00671) (0.0134) 
Large_Small -0.156*** -0.107*** 0.0968*** 
 (0.0159) (0.00835) (0.0167) 
TD*Large_Small 0.00666 0.000930 -0.0584*** 
 (0.0183) (0.00958) (0.0191) 
Size -0.115*** -0.103*** 0.0708*** 
 (0.00480) (0.00252) (0.00500) 
CashFlow -0.793*** -0.174*** 0.624*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0151) (0.0297) 
STDROA 0.000103*** 0.0000909*** -0.0000383*** 
 (0.0000108) (0.00000569) (0.0000112) 
InterestRate -0.00290 -0.000517 0.00665 
 (0.00586) (0.00308) (0.00612) 
ClassType -0.0156 0.0190*** -0.0693*** 
 (0.0112) (0.00589) (0.0118) 
InverseMills 1.987*** 0.599*** -1.050*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0338) (0.0661) 
Constant 1.569*** 1.004*** -0.526*** 
 (0.0810) (0.0425) (0.0845) 
Observations 5241 5241 5031 
Adjusted R2 0.3632 0.3756 0.1793 
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Panel E: Second stage Heckman Correction Results for NCL-Small Vs. EF firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TBorrEq TBondEq RE/TBorrEq 
TD 0.0757*** 0.0842*** 0.0954*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0128) (0.0305) 
NA_NCLSmall 0.264*** 0.229*** -0.0341 
 (0.0212) (0.0102) (0.0244) 
TD*NA_NCLSmall -0.00764 -0.0491*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0140) (0.0333) 
Size -0.141*** -0.152*** 0.0836*** 
 (0.00684) (0.00329) (0.00775) 
CashFlow -0.828*** -0.174*** 0.696*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0205) (0.0478) 
STDROA 0.000946*** 0.000779*** -0.000545*** 
 (0.0000920) (0.0000443) (0.000103) 
InterestRate -0.000806 0.00175 0.00604 
 (0.00737) (0.00355) (0.00837) 
ClassType -0.00958 -0.00186 -0.0410*** 
 (0.0139) (0.00667) (0.0159) 
InverseMills 1.710*** 0.399*** -0.928*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0292) (0.0679) 
Constant 1.251*** 0.907*** -0.459*** 
 (0.1000) (0.0481) (0.114) 
Observations 2938 2938 2827 
Adjusted R2 0.4445 0.5743 0.1917 
 
To sum, firms subject to reform increase total external financing and market-based 
financing in the post period. The increase in external financing is greater as compared to cross-
listed firms. We argue that information transparency is higher for cross-listed firms that had to 
comply with disclosure requirements on other exchanges.  So, Clause-49 reform did not affect 
them as much. Firms subject to reform increased their external capital relative to internal capital. 
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The change was higher for firms listed only domestically, relative to cross listed firms. Overall, 
our results suggest the reforms were most effective in relieving information asymmetry and 
increasing financing for firms that did not have access to other capital markets. 
5.3. Financial constraints 
Hypothesis 2 asserts that, in an opaque market environment, cash to cash-flow sensitivity 
and investment to cash-flow sensitivity is high. This is because firms are more dependent on 
internally generated cash flows for their investment. We predict that a decrease in information 
asymmetry would lower the cost of external financing which in turn, would reduce the financial 
constraints of a firm in the post reform period.  
5.3.1.  The sensitivity of cash to cash flow 
To evaluate whether Clause 49 was effective in mitigating financial constraints, we adopt 
series of test following Erel et.al. (2013). First, we test for sensitivities of cash with cash-flow. 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) suggest that managers save cash from incremental cash 
flow if they believe to face financial constraints. We estimate cash to cash flow sensitivity is using 
the following model: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐺𝐷 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here, dependent variable is the cash holdings while independent variable includes an interaction 
term of cash flow and TD. Group dummies comparing different group of firms and are defined in 
Appendix 1. A negative coefficient of interaction term 𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 will suggest that sensitivity 
declines for CL firm in the post reform period while sum of coefficients of both interaction terms 
if turns out to be negative will suggest that sensitivity declines for conforming firms in the post 
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reform period. A negative coefficient for interaction term 𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐺𝐷 suggests two-way 
difference that sensitivity decline more for NCL firms as compared to CL or EF group of firms. 
5.3.2.  The sensitivity of investment to cash flow  
We estimate investment to cash flow sensitivity with the following specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐺𝐷 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The specification for investment to cash flow sensitivity has different measures of 
investment as dependent variable; TD, cashflow, group-dummy and interaction terms as 
independent variable and is controlled for other factors. There are four group dummies and are 
defined in Appendix 1. Results would be inferred in the same fashion as described in the previous 
section. A negative coefficient of interaction term 𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐺𝐷 will suggest that investment to 
cash flow sensitivity declines more for conforming firms as compared to cross-listed or excluded 
firms. 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 in the models for ICF and CCF is the vector of control variables, µ𝑖 is industry fixed 
effects used to control changes at industry level and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. In the basic specification, 
the model includes the following control variables. To control for changes at the firm-level, log of 
total assets is used to control for firm’s size, Cash flow from operations is controlled for as a 
measure of liquidity and Sales growth is used to control for firms’ growth opportunities. 
Alternatively, Earnings before depreciation interest and taxes is used instead of Cash flows; 
Market -to-Book ratio is used instead of Sales Growth.16   
                                                          
16 Results for alternate specifications are not shown in the paper for the brevity of the paper. The result remains the 
same as of basic specification shown in the paper.  
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Table 9 : Investment-Cash Flow sensitivity (ICF) 
Regression results for Investment-Cash Flow sensitivity (ICF) for 1260 firms over the period 1996-
2008. Measures of investment are a) Capex as investment in fixed assets shown in column 1; b) 
Investment as investment in total assets shown in column 2; c) CapexRD as investment in fixed 
assets and R&D shown in column 3. Regression results for Cash-Cash Flow sensitivity (ICF) for 
same sample is shown in column 4 of this table. TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post 
clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause period (1996-2000). Cash Flow is sum of profit 
after tax and depreciation of the firm. TD*CashFlow is the interaction term. Size is measured as 
log of total assets. Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). 
Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for Indian Business groups and 0 for stand-alone 
firms. Interest Rate is the annual prime lending rate in India and GDP is the growth rate in gross 
domestic product for Indian economy, both data fetched from World Bank. All firm level data are 
from CMIE-Prowess database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Capex Investment CapexRD Cash 
TD -0.00219 0.0895*** -0.00119 0.0126*** 
 (0.00236) (0.00640) (0.00430) (0.00126) 
TD*CashFlow -0.0374** -0.200*** -0.107*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0410) (0.0368) (0.00811) 
CashFlow 0.0621*** 0.328*** 0.105*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0337) (0.0270) (0.00673) 
Size 0.0109*** 0.0366*** 0.00854*** 0.00182*** 
 (0.000778) (0.00211) (0.00124) (0.000416) 
Salesgrowth 0.0294*** 0.147*** 0.0389*** 0.00311** 
 (0.00236) (0.00640) (0.00477) (0.00129) 
ClassType -0.0129*** -0.0392*** -0.00671* 0.00254* 
 (0.00252) (0.00682) (0.00402) (0.00135) 
GDP 0.00100* 0.00401*** 0.000390 0.000507* 
 (0.000522) (0.00141) (0.000811) (0.000278) 
InterestRate 0.00718*** 0.0166*** 0.00682*** -0.000855 
 (0.00146) (0.00396) (0.00227) (0.000778) 
Constant -0.110*** -0.385*** -0.122*** 0.0203* 
 (0.0225) (0.0610) (0.0357) (0.0120) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7837 7837 2474 7591 
Adjusted R2 0.0787 0.1926 0.0979 0.0854 
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A dummy variable is used to control for whether firm belong to an Indian Business Group 
(IBG) or a stand-alone firm. Classdummy is used with value equal to 1 for Indian Business groups 
and 0 for stand-alone firms. Regression model also includes GDP and Interest rates to control for 
macro-economic changes. The result for both ICF and CCF sensitivities is shown in Table 9. Panel 
A of the table is discussed below in detail.  
Significant and positive coefficient of Cash Flow in Table 9 suggest the presence of present 
and expected future financial constraints in Indian firms. Column 1 in table 9 represents ICF 
sensitivity for all firms. A negative coefficient of interaction term TD*CashFlow suggests that 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases for all firms in the post period. Column 1 in panels 
B and C compares ICF sensitivities of NCL/NCL-Large firms relative to CL firms. Coefficient of 
interaction term (TD* Cashflow) is negative and significant which means CCF decreases for CL 
firms. Sum of coefficient of interaction terms is negative and significant which suggests that ICF 
decreases for NCL-Large firms in the post period. However, the two-way difference as evident 
from table suggests no relative difference between ICF sensitivities of NCL-Large/NCL and CL 
firms. It is evident from other columns that ICF sensitivity decreases across all other sub-groups.  
We check robustness of our result using different measures of investment. While column 
1shows investment in fixed asset, we show investment in total assets (Investment) in column 2 and 
investment in fixed assets plus R&D (CapexRD) as measure of investment in column 3. The 
sensitivity of CapexRD to cash flow decreases across all firms and NCL firms (both Large and 
small). The sensitivity of Investment to cash flow decreases for all firms and NCL-Large firms; 
the sensitivity does not change for NCL Small firms or CL firms.  
Column 4 shows cash to cash flow sensitivity (CCF) to be decreasing for NCL and NCL-
Large firms. NCLs experience greater decrease in cash flow sensitivity than the CL group as 
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evident from coefficient of TD*CashFlow*Group-dummy in panels B and C respectively. The 
sensitivity of Cash to cash flow decreases for all firms and NCL-Large firms; the sensitivity does 
not change for NCL Small firms. 
Overall, results provide evidence that firms subject to rule change witness a decrease in both ICF 
and CCF sensitivities from pre to post period. It implies that firms subjected to Clause 49 show an 
alleviation of present and expected future financial constraints.  The effect is more pronounced for 
domestic firms relative to cross-listed firms for future constraints. Their reliance of investment and 
financial slack on cash flow is relaxed post-reform.  They seem to have a stronger capital safety 
net in post-reform. 
In the next section we see whether firms utilize the marginal increase in external capital 
and a stronger capital safety net by investing in positive NPV projects.  
5.4. Investment 
Investment is considered efficient at the optimal level where firm’s value is maximized.  If 
there are financial constraints, then a firm will have to choose among projects, they cannot take up 
all of them. We expect to see an increase in level of investment with enhanced information 
environment. 
Univariate results are shown in Table 10.  Three different measures (Capex, Investment, 
and CapexRD) of investment are used and compare from pre to post period of Clause 49. It is 
evident from the table that investment in fixed assets (Capex) decreases while investment in total 
assets (Investment) increases in the post period. We refrain from jumping to any conclusion 
without performing a multivariate OLS regression.  
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Table 10 : Summary Statistics for Investment Decisions and Performance of firms 
This table presents summary statistics for accounting variables pertaining to firms’ investment and 
performance. The measures of investment are:  a) Capex: It denotes the long-term investment and 
is measured as the change in gross fixed asset plus net asset sales deflated by total assets; b) 
Investment: It is the total investment inclusive of both long term and current assets and is measured 
as change in total assets deflated by total assets in prior year; c) CapexRD: It is the investment in 
fixed assets and R&D. Measures of firms’ performance are a) ROA: is return on assets measured 
as PAT over total assets; b) Tobin’s Q: It is measured as total assets plus market value of equity 
minus book value of equity divided by total assets. 
Cash is the total cash and cash equivalent of a firm deflated by total assets. All variables are sourced 
from CMIE-Prowess database. We assess the differences in means using the mean difference test 
and medians using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
Mean Median 
 
Pre Post Diff P-Value Pre Post P-Value 
Panel A: All Firms 
Cash 0.029 0.045 0.016 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.0000 
CapexTA 0.075 0.068 -0.007 0.000 0.041 0.039 0.0000 
Investment 0.111 0.220 0.109 0.000 0.068 0.151 0.0000 
    CapexRD 0.079 0.072 -0.006 0.023 0.0517 0.053 0.3913 
ROA 0.022 0.040 0.018 0.000 0.029 0.039 0.0000 
TobinQ 0.982 1.441 0.459 0.000 0.861 1.156 0.0000 
Panel B: CL Firms 
Cash 0.040 0.080 0.040 0.000 0.024 0.058 0.0000 
CapexTA 0.092 0.063 -0.029 0.008 0.069 0.044 0.0072 
Investment 0.121 0.204 0.083 0.001 0.097 0.185 0.0000 
CapexRD 0.094 0.064 -0.030 0.017 0.075 0.050 0.0326 
ROA 0.047 0.085 0.038 0.000 0.049 0.087 0.0000 
TobinQ 1.291 2.079 0.788 0.000 1.008 1.789 0.0000 
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Panel C: NCL Firms 
Cash 0.028 0.044 0.016 0.000 0.018 0.023 0.0000 
CapexTA 0.077 0.069 -0.008 0.000 0.042 0.040 0.0003 
Investment 0.112 0.219 0.107 0.000 0.067 0.150 0.0000 
CapexRD 0.0797 0.0730 -0.0067 0.0327 0.051 0.053 0.2953 
ROA 0.021 0.038 0.017 0.000 0.029 0.038 0.0000 
TobinQ 0.972 1.424 0.452 0.000 0.852 1.141 0.0000 
Panel D: NCL_Large Firms 
Cash 0.030 0.049 0.020 0.000 0.019 0.025 0.0000 
CapexTA 0.082 0.071 -0.011 0.000 0.049 0.043 0.0000 
Investment 0.133 0.218 0.085 0.000 0.083 0.158 0.0000 
CapexRD 0.0831 0.0742 -0.0089 0.0129 0.0565 0.0552 0.0448 
ROA 0.031 0.041 0.010 0.000 0.036 0.043 0.0000 
TobinQ 1.062 1.543 0.481 0.000 0.886 1.220 0.0000 
Panel E: NCL_Small Firms 
Cash 0.026 0.037 0.011 0.000 0.017 0.021 0.0000 
CapexTA 0.070 0.066 -0.004 0.202 0.032 0.035 0.7561 
Investment 0.084 0.220 0.136 0.000 0.049 0.138 0.0000 
CapexRD 0.0689 0.0692 0.0002 0.9730 0.0379 0.0483 0.1562 
ROA 0.009 0.035 0.026 0.000 0.018 0.033 0.0000 
TobinQ 0.852 1.256 0.404 0.000 0.806 1.064 0.0000 
Panel E: EF Firms 
Cash 0.032 0.040 0.008 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.5477 
CapexTA 0.057 0.064 0.007 0.231 0.030 0.038 0.1789 
Investment 0.096 0.238 0.142 0.000 0.065 0.152 0.0000 
CapexRD 0.0621 0.0733 0.0112 0.2945 0.0373 0.0583 0.0264 
ROA 0.025 0.044 0.019 0.001 0.029 0.039 0.0004 
TobinQ 0.992 1.406 0.414 0.000 0.917 1.166 0.0000 
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5.4.1. Level of investment 
We estimate the level of investment with the following specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷+𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐷 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐺𝐷 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Column 1 in each panel of table 11 presents evidence for decrease in Capex. The coefficient 
of TD is negative and significant in each of these panels while the sum of coefficients of TD and 
interaction term is negative and significant as shown in panels B and C. It suggests that Capex 
decreases significantly for all firms as a sample, and individually as CL firms as well as NCL/NCL-
Large firms. Sum of coefficient is insignificant in panel D suggesting that there is no change in 
Capex for NCL_Small firms. Coefficient of TD is not significant in panel E suggesting that Capex 
remains unchanged for EF firms in post reform period. Combining results from columns 4 and 5 
implies that larger firms decrease their investment in fixed assets while small firms retain their 
earlier investment level. This is consistent with the findings of Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri 
(2000) which document capital efficiency in the post liberalization period. They find evidence that 
investment did not go up during 1992-1995 and conclude that capital raised from the market may 
have been diverted towards speculated financial investment by most firms.  
Further, we measure investment in fixed assets and R&D (CapexRD) as shown in columns 
2 of each panel in table 11. We find this measure of investment behaves similar to Capex. 
Investment in fixed assets (Capex) or (Capex+RD) decreases across all firms, and NCL or NCL-
Large firms. It does not change for NCL-Small or EF firms. 
Then, we measured investment in total assets (Investment) to account for decision to invest 
in both current and fixed assets. The result is shown in columns 3 of each panel in table 11. To our 
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surprise, investment in total assets (Investment) increases across all firms, and NCL (both large 
and small firms); even for EF firms. It does not change for CL firms.  It implies that investment in 
current assets increases for all sub-group of firms irrespective of the fact whether they conform to 
Clause 49 or not. Also, small firms invest more than large firms (both in current and fixed assets). 
This suggest that investment decision is not affected by Clause 49 rather the investment decision 
lies somewhere else to where we expected it to be.  
While in the regression of level of investment as dependent variable, Table 11 indicates a 
positive association of investment with size, liquidity, and high growth opportunities. A major 
finding is that stand-alone firms in India invest more relative to firms belonging to Indian Business 
group. High GDP growth and prime lending rate also have positive effect on investment decisions.  
Table 11 : The effect of rule change on investment level and cash hoarding of firms 
Regression results for level of investment and cash is shown for all sample and different sub-group 
of samples. There are panels in this table. Panel A represents results for all firms while panel B 
compares the level of investment and cash between CL and NCL-Large firms. Each of these panels 
have 4 columns numbered 1-4 that show regression result for Capex, Investment, CapexRD and 
Cash as dependent variable respectively. Capex is measures as change in fixed assets deflated by 
total assets; Investment is measured as change in total assets divided by total assets in the year (t-
1). CapexRD is the sum of Capex and R&D expenses deflated by total assets while Cash is cash 
and cash equivalent of any firm.  
TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause 
period (1996-2000). CL_NCL is the indicator variable with value 1 for NCL firms and 0 for CL 
firms. Interaction term shown in all columns captures the effect on Y by comparing the average 
change over time in the treatment firm as compared to the control firms. Other control variables 
are defined below.  
 
Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for Indian Business groups and 0 for stand-alone 
firms. Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash Flow is sum of profit after tax and depreciation 
of the firm. Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). Interest 
Rate is the annual prime lending rate in India and GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product 
for Indian economy, both data sets fetched from World Bank. All firm level data are from CMIE-
Prowess database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Panel A: Level of investment and cash for all firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment CapexRD Cash  
TD -0.00695*** 0.0723*** -0.0111*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00583) (0.00343) (0.00115) 
CashFlow 0.0375*** 0.195*** 0.0499*** 0.0245*** 
 (0.00721) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.00384) 
Size 0.0109*** 0.0365*** 0.00842*** 0.00182*** 
 (0.000780) (0.00211) (0.00125) (0.000416) 
Salesgrowth 0.0308*** 0.152*** 0.0402*** 0.00339*** 
 (0.00235) (0.00638) (0.00477) (0.00128) 
ClassType -0.0128*** -0.0382*** -0.00573 0.00266** 
 (0.00252) (0.00684) (0.00402) (0.00135) 
GDP -0.000292 0.000972 -0.000828 0.000652*** 
 (0.000453) (0.00123) (0.000707) (0.000241) 
Constant -0.00603 -0.140*** -0.0195 0.00943** 
 (0.00866) (0.0235) (0.0157) (0.00459) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7837 7837 2474 7591 
Adjusted R2 0.0753 0.1884 0.0918 0.0840 
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Panel B: Comparing level of investment and cash between NCL-Large and CL firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment CapexRD Cash 
TD -0.0309** 0.0401 -0.0305** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0349) (0.0137) (0.00720) 
CL_NCLLarge 0.0155 0.105*** 0.0105 -0.00333 
 (0.00969) (0.0261) (0.0107) (0.00541) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.0191 0.00380 0.0169 -0.0124* 
 (0.0132) (0.0356) (0.0141) (0.00736) 
CashFlow 0.0434*** 0.196*** 0.0504** 0.0293*** 
 (0.00980) (0.0264) (0.0230) (0.00551) 
Size 0.0121*** 0.0463*** 0.00940*** 0.00177** 
 (0.00138) (0.00373) (0.00200) (0.000784) 
Salesgrowth 0.0289*** 0.150*** 0.0341*** 0.00421* 
 (0.00374) (0.0101) (0.00546) (0.00218) 
ClassType -0.0180*** -0.0513*** -0.00338 0.000435 
 (0.00375) (0.0101) (0.00555) (0.00211) 
GDP -0.000845 0.000787 -0.000875 0.000923** 
 (0.000648) (0.00175) (0.000854) (0.000364) 
Constant -0.0294 -0.298*** -0.0465* 0.0128 
 (0.0189) (0.0508) (0.0277) (0.0106) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3926 3926 1693 3798 
Adjusted R2 0.0798 0.1734 0.0958 0.1065 
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Panel C: Comparing level of investment and cash between NCL-Large and NCL-Small firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment CapexRD Cash 
TD -0.0142*** 0.0331*** -0.0144*** 0.0130*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00829) (0.00436) (0.00160) 
CL_NCLLarge 0.00490 0.0491*** -0.00380 0.000401 
 (0.00357) (0.00952) (0.00622) (0.00185) 
TD*CL_NCLLarge 0.0103** 0.0449*** 0.0102 -0.00396* 
 (0.00433) (0.0116) (0.00752) (0.00223) 
CashFlow 0.0374*** 0.195*** 0.0349* 0.0274*** 
 (0.00767) (0.0205) (0.0199) (0.00397) 
Size 0.0141*** 0.0574*** 0.0108*** 0.00197*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00287) (0.00182) (0.000559) 
Salesgrowth 0.0314*** 0.162*** 0.0372*** 0.00319** 
 (0.00254) (0.00679) (0.00495) (0.00135) 
ClassType -0.0141*** -0.0422*** -0.00781* 0.00186 
 (0.00283) (0.00757) (0.00451) (0.00147) 
GDP -0.000120 0.00196 -0.000552 0.000689*** 
 (0.000484) (0.00129) (0.000756) (0.000250) 
Constant -0.0300*** -0.305*** -0.0431** 0.00321 
 (0.0112) (0.0300) (0.0202) (0.00582) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6927 6927 2167 6708 
Adjusted R2 0.0813 0.2181 0.0933 0.0861 
 
A point to note here is that if Clause 49 helps easing financial constraint and increases level 
of capital in the post period as evident from previous results, then we should see an increase in 
long term investment of firms. The fact that we do not see an increase in Capex rather investment 
in current assets seem to be increasing in post -period, we test and estimate level of cash holdings 
in the pre-period and post-period. 
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5.4.2. Level of cash holdings 
We estimate cash level using similar specification as that of investment level with measure 
of cash and cash equivalent used as dependent variable instead. The results are shown in column 4 
of each panel in table 11.  
It is evident from the table that Cash increases for all firms in the post period. Coefficient 
of TD is positive and significant in column 4 of all panels of table 11. It suggests CL firms and 
NCL-Large firms increases cash hoarding in the post period. Sum of co-efficient for TD and 
interaction terms in all these columns are positive and significant suggesting an increase in cash 
hoarding for NCL, NCL-Large and NCL-Small firms.  
The result further indicates that bigger firms with high liquidity in terms of operating cash 
flow, increases cash in the post reform period. Accumulating cash decision does not vary with 
firms’ affiliation as stand-alone or Indian Business group. Industry characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables like GDP growth positively impact the decision to hoard cash by firms. 
To sum, cash hoarding increases for all firms and all sub-group of firms irrespective of their 
conformity and sizes. 
5.4.3. Do constrained firms benefit more from Clause 49? 
We test this question for funds raised, investment level and cash hoarding. We use KZ 
index as a measure of financial constraint.  It is computed using the equation: 
KZ= -1.0019*CashFlow/PPE+.2826*Tobin's Q + 3.139* Borrowing/NetWorth -
39.367*Total Dividend/PPE - 1.314*Cash/PPE 
KZ Index is estimated for each firm in each year between 1996 and 2000 and averaged 
over the 5 years in pre-period.  This measure is used to categorize firms into more constrained and 
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less constrained. FC is the indicator variable set to 1 whose KZ exceeds median KZ of all firms 
and 0 otherwise. We use the following empirical model to see whether the highly constrained/high 
info asymmetric firms are the ones that benefit more from Clause 49: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐶 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Columns 1-4 in Table 12 show levels of investment in fixed assets (Capex), investment in total 
assets (Investment), total external financing (TBorrEq) and financial slack (Cash) respectively. 
Sum of coefficient of TD and TD*FC is negative and significant in column 1 and positive in 
columns 2, 3 and 4. It suggests that more constrained firms decrease their investment in fixed 
assets and increase their investment in current assets, raise funds externally and hoard more cash 
in the post period. Co-efficient of TD in all column illustrates that less constraint firms’ behavior 
is same as more constraint firms. However, more constrained firms increase more slack as 
compared to less constrained firms in the post period as shown in column 4. 
Table 12 : Characteristics for firms those were constrained in the pre-period 
Fixed effects regression for firms those were constrained in the pre-reform period. The dependent 
variables are investment in current assets and total assets (Capex, Investment), total external 
financing (TBorrEq) and financial slack (Cash) shown in columns 1-4. FC is the indicator variable 
set to 1 for financially high constrained firms and 0 for less constraint firms. We use KZ index as 
a measure of financial constraint.  It is computed using the equation: 
KZ= -1.0019*CashFlow/PPE + .2826*Tobin's Q + 3.139*Total Borrowing/NetWorth -
39.367*Total Dividend/PPE - 1.314*Cash/PPE 
KZ Index is estimated for each firm in each year between 1996 and 2000 and averaged over the 5 
years pre-period.  This measure is used to categorize firms into more constrained and less 
constrained. FC = 1 for firms whose KZ exceeds median KZ of all firms; 0 otherwise. TD is the 
dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause period 
(1996-2000). Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash Flow is sum of profit after tax and 
depreciation of the firm. Salesgrowth change in sales from year (t-1) to t divided by sales in year 
(t-1). GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian economy, both data sets fetched 
from World Bank. All firm level data are from CMIE-Prowess database. The symbol ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
table 12 continued 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment TBorrEq Cash  
TD*FCdummy -0.00226 0.0360*** 0.104*** 0.00352** 
 (0.00293) (0.00787) (0.00921) (0.00167) 
CashFlow 0.0442*** 0.363*** -1.111*** 0.0689*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0334) (0.0391) (0.00712) 
Size 0.00554*** 0.0210*** -0.0426*** 0.00372*** 
 (0.000744) (0.00201) (0.00235) (0.000427) 
Salesgrowth 0.0507*** 0.242*** -0.00545 0.00273 
 (0.00364) (0.00978) (0.0114) (0.00209) 
GDP -0.00120** 0.00292** 0.000520 0.00143*** 
 (0.000507) (0.00136) (0.00160) (0.000289) 
Constant 0.0165 -0.0756*** 0.897*** -0.0103* 
 (0.0102) (0.0275) (0.0322) (0.00584) 
Industry Fixed 
Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5731 5766 5766 5695 
Adjusted R2 0.0818 0.1827 0.2389 0.0929 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment TBorrEq Cash  
TD -0.00699** 0.0661*** 0.0544*** 0.00793*** 
 (0.00335) (0.00898) (0.0105) (0.00190) 
FCdummy 0.0102*** -0.00672 0.0942*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.00322) (0.00861) (0.0101) (0.00182) 
TDFCdummy -0.00303 -0.00625 0.0135 0.00566** 
 (0.00459) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.00260) 
CashFlow 0.0510*** 0.352*** -1.062*** 0.0599*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0335) (0.0392) (0.00711) 
Size 0.00538*** 0.0192*** -0.0480*** 0.00399*** 
 (0.000768) (0.00206) (0.00241) (0.000437) 
Salesgrowth 0.0512*** 0.238*** -0.00716 0.00202 
 (0.00363) (0.00973) (0.0114) (0.00207) 
GDP -0.000854* 0.000839 0.000150 0.000999*** 
 (0.000514) (0.00138) (0.00161) (0.000291) 
Constant 0.0153 -0.0694** 0.896*** -0.00867 
 (0.0102) (0.0273) (0.0319) (0.00578) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5731 5766 5766 5695 
Adjusted R2 0.0857 0.1932 0.2503 0.1132 
  
69 
 
5.4.4. Characteristics of under-invested firms 
Investment is considered efficient at the optimal level where firm’s value is maximized. In 
absence of market friction, a firm is supposed to be investing efficiently if it takes up all and only 
positive net present value (NPV) projects (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Thus, investment 
inefficiency can be considered as any deviation from the optimal investment decisions; 
overinvestment (higher than optimal) or underinvestment (lower than optimal).  
To compute investment efficiencies before and after Clause 49; we start with calculating expected 
investment level for sample firms closely following Richardson (2006). Total investment (Itotal) in 
each firm year is measured as capital expenditure scaled by total assets. New investment (Inew) in 
any given year is the difference between investment required for maintenance (proxied by 
depreciation and amortization) and total investment. 
 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡   
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡 +  𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡 − 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒,𝑡 
New Investment 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 is decomposed into expected investment expenditure and underinvestment 
(overinvestment). We model new investment as a function of growth opportunities measured by 
sales growth and other firms’ fundamentals. The new investment expenditure in the prior year is 
included to capture other firm characteristics not included in the model. We also include industry 
fixed effects to capture the variation at the firm level.  
𝐼 ∗𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑞𝑖𝑡−1+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Residual =𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓  𝐼 ∗𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 
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The estimated residual from equation of 𝐼 ∗𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 captures deviation from expected level of 
investment. Positive residual suggests overinvestment while negative residual identifies firms as 
underinvested.  
Underinvested firms are more likely to benefit from Clause 49 as increased availability of 
external capital provides a safety net, allowing under-invested firms to increase investment levels 
(and reduce financial slack) in the post-reform period.  On partitioning the firms as over-invested 
firms and under-invested firms in the pre-period, we expect to see a significant increase in the 
investment of under-invested firms and a decrease in over-invested firms in the after-period 
signifying the reduction in investment inefficiency in the post reform period.  
To categorize firms into underinvested and overinvested firms, residual value for each firm 
in each year between 1996 and 2000 is averaged over the 5 years in the pre-period. A dummy 
variable Invdummy is set to 1 if the mean residual thus computed is less than equal to zero and set 
to 0 otherwise.  
Invdummy = 1 if Mean Residual<=0 (underinvested firms in pre-period) 
Invdummy = 0 if Mean Residual>0 (Over invested firms in pre-period) 
A quick look at the statistics of Invdummy shows that about 67% of the sample underinvested 
and 33% of overinvested in the pre-reform years. We model the following equation to test the 
transition of under-invested firms from pre to post period. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
We use three different measures of investment as dependent variable for above regression. 
Columns 1-4 show levels of investment in fixed assets (Capex), investment in total assets 
(Investment), total external financing (TBorrEq) and financial slack (Cash) respectively. Sum of 
coefficient of TD and TD*FC is positive and significant in all columns. Results show that 
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underinvested firms marginally increase their investment in fixed assets (Capex) in the post reform 
period. They witness no change in CapexRD while they show an increase in Investment and Cash. 
Co-efficient of TD in columns 1 through 4 illustrates that overinvested firms decreased their Capex 
and CapexRD significantly and show no change in investment in fixed assets (Investment). Both 
under and over invested firms increase their slack in the post period.  
Table 13 : Level of Investment and cash hoarding for Under-Invested firms 
 
Regression results for level of investment and cash is shown for under-invested firms in the pre-
period. We use Richardson’s model to determine under-invested firms. New investment Inew is 
estimated using the following equation. Actual investment (Inew) is calculated as Capex minus 
Depreciation and amortization. The residual value (Inew – Fitted Inew) for each firm in each year 
between 1996 and 2000 is averaged over the 5 years pre-period.  This measure is used to 
categorize firms into underinvested and overinvested firms. Mean error less than equal to zero are 
under-invested firms and vice-versa.  
Inew = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑎𝑠h𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡h𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼5𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑞𝑖𝑡−1+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Columns 1-4 show regression result for Capex, Investment, CapexRD and Cash as dependent 
variable respectively. Capex is measures as change in fixed assets deflated by total assets; 
Investment is measured as change in total assets divided by total assets in the year (t-1). CapexRD 
is the sum of Capex and R&D expenses deflated by total assets while Cash is cash and cash 
equivalent of any firm. TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause period (2006-2008) 
and 0 in the pre-clause period (1996-2000). Invdummy is the dummy variable set to 1 for under-
invested firms and 0 for over-invested firms. Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 for 
Indian Business groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash 
Flow is sum of profit after tax and depreciation of the firm. Salesgrowth change in sales from year 
(t-1) to t divided by sales in year (t-1). GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian 
economy, both data sets fetched from World Bank. All firm level data are from CMIE-Prowess 
database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Capex Investment CapexRD Cash  
TD -0.0386*** 0.0133 -0.0365*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00893) (0.00508) (0.00177) 
Invdummy -0.0582*** -0.101*** -0.0472*** 0.000628 
 (0.00267) (0.00738) (0.00427) (0.00148) 
TD*Invdummy 0.0530*** 0.0985*** 0.0431*** 0.00111 
 (0.00401) (0.0111) (0.00630) (0.00220) 
CashFlow 0.0306*** 0.184*** 0.0318* 0.0246*** 
 (0.00701) (0.0193) (0.0184) (0.00384) 
Size 0.0103*** 0.0356*** 0.00841*** 0.00186*** 
 (0.000760) (0.00210) (0.00122) (0.000418) 
Salesgrowth 0.0289*** 0.149*** 0.0393*** 0.00342*** 
 (0.00228) (0.00631) (0.00466) (0.00128) 
ClassType -0.0142*** -0.0408*** -0.0104*** 0.00266** 
 (0.00245) (0.00676) (0.00395) (0.00135) 
GDP -0.000287 0.000984 -0.000783 0.000652*** 
 (0.000439) (0.00121) (0.000690) (0.000241) 
Constant 0.0375*** -0.0652*** 0.0186 0.00867* 
 (0.00865) (0.0239) (0.0158) (0.00473) 
Industry Fixed 
Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7837 7837 2474 7591 
Adjusted R2 0.1284 0.2074 0.1347 0.0839 
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5.5. Firm performance 
 In this section, we estimate the incremental contribution of increase in investment towards 
increasing performance of firms in the post period. The improved investment efficiency attributed 
to more stringent (and more rigorously monitored) disclosure requirements is expected to lead to 
better market performance of Indian firms.  We test if there was a positive market response to the 
implementation of Clause 49. We document that ROA and Tobin’s Q as a measure of market 
performance increases over the years which is indicative of improved dissemination of firm level 
information in the capital market and overall increase in the market efficiency. Further we test if 
there is any improvement, how much of that can be contributed towards increase in investment. 
We interacted the terms TD and Invdummy to account for underinvested firms in the regression 
model and reperform the analysis. 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′sQ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + β𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡+µ𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′sQ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝐷 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐷 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + β𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡+ µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
We use two measures of performance as dependent variable for above regression. 
Columns 1 shows Tobin’s Q (TobinQ) and column 2 represents return on assets (ROA) 
respectively. Panel A denotes results for all firms in the sample. Co-efficient of TD is positive and 
significant in columns. It implies that performance of firms improved in the post period.  
Result from panel B signifies whether the improved performance can be allocated to 
improvement in investment efficiency of the firms. Invdummy is the category variable set to 1 for 
under-invested firms and 0 for over-invested firms. Sum of coefficient of TD and TD*Invdummy 
represents changes in performance of under-invested firms while co-efficient of TD represents 
over-invested firms respectively. Negative coefficient of TD in column 2 suggests that return on 
assets decreases for over-invested firms in the post-period. The sum of co-efficient as shown in  
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Table 14 : Performance of firms 
Regression results for performance of firms is shown for all firms in Panel A and for under-
invested firms in panel B. Dependent variables are Tobin’s Q shown in column A and ROA (return 
on assets) shown in column B respectively. TD is the dummy variable with value 1 in post clause 
period (2006-2008) and 0 in the pre-clause period (1996-2000). Capex is the investment in fixed 
asset deflated by total assets. Size is measured as log of total assets. Cash Flow is sum of profit 
after tax and depreciation of the firm. GDP is the growth rate in gross domestic product for Indian 
economy, both data fetched from World Bank. Classdummy is the dummy with value equal to 1 
for Indian Business groups and 0 for stand-alone firms. Invdummy is the dummy variable set to 1 
for under-invested firms and 0 for over-invested firms. All firm level data are from CMIE-Prowess 
database. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The symbol ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Performance for all firms 
 (1) (3) 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
TD 0.376*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.0156) (0.00152) 
Capex -0.156** 0.0484*** 
 (0.0717) (0.00704) 
Size 0.0863*** 0.00500*** 
 (0.00430) (0.000416) 
CashFlow 0.289*** 0.278*** 
 (0.0408) (0.00365) 
InterestRate 0.0206*** 0.00665*** 
 (0.00587) (0.000576) 
GDP 0.0275*** 0.000980*** 
 (0.00325) (0.000319) 
Constant 0.00765 -0.122*** 
 (0.104) (0.0100) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 8508 9967 
Adjusted R2 0.2230 0.4163 
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Panel B: Performance for Under-invested firms 
 (1) (2) 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
TD 0.372*** -0.00345* 
 (0.0240) (0.00201) 
Invdummy 0.0148 -0.0150*** 
 (0.0198) (0.00166) 
TD*Invdummy 0.0467 0.0179*** 
 (0.0297) (0.00249) 
CashFlow 0.0305 0.429*** 
 (0.0570) (0.00435) 
Size 0.0690*** 0.00412*** 
 (0.00573) (0.000471) 
Salesgrowth 0.0841*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.0181) (0.00142) 
ClassType 0.0675*** 0.000224 
 (0.0183) (0.00152) 
GDP 0.0220*** -0.000483* 
 (0.00324) (0.000272) 
Constant 0.279*** -0.00438 
 (0.0682) (0.00536) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes 
Observations 6732 7837 
Adjusted R2 0.2529 0.6084 
  
Table 14 is positive and significant in both columns. It suggests that both Tobin’s Q and 
ROA increases for under invested firms in the post period. Thus, we conclude that performance of 
underinvested firms in the pre-period contributes positively to the improved performance.  
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5.6. A deeper look at cash 
It is evident from the results so far that Clause 49 seems to alleviate info asymmetry leading 
to marginal increase in capital raising for firms; but more importantly, it relieves financial 
constraints by creating a stronger "capital safety net" for firms. We document an increase in 
external capital even after controlling for the self-selection and endogeneity. Further, we find that 
investment in fixed assets decreases but that in total assets increases. Investment in total assets 
include investment in fixed assets plus investment in current assets. To confirm our finding, we 
compare for level of cash hoardings by firm in the two periods. We find that cash level increases 
in the post -period. It implies that firms seem to be accumulating slack (cash) instead of increasing 
investment.  In fact, the pre-emptive motive for cash suggests that with transparency improvement 
firms should reduce slack.  
We try to find rationale for why firms increase their holdings in current assets, while their 
investments in capital expenditure goes down. This conclusion raises an immediate question: if 
the reforms had the ability to raise external financing, why had not it result in increasing firms’ 
investment? The firms were not only able to access more external financing in India, there are also 
evidence that firms were gaining access to capital from outside shareholders, especially foreign 
investors (Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). The rest of the section explores this additional 
consequence of the reform. If this increase in capital does not result in an increase in investment, 
rather add up to an increase in cash then it indicates another kind of agency problem. This agency 
may emanate from lack of investment opportunities. The findings of this paper suggest two things. 
First, either managers are not investing in projects due to unavailability of positive NPV projects 
or second, managers are hoarding cash for some other reason not known to us.  
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5.6.1. Mergers and acquisitions 
Government-mandated disclosure requirement in the form of Clause 49 does not translate 
into improved investment level. Perhaps firms are hoarding cash (instead of investing) because 
they want to grow through outside acquisitions.  We find out what happens to mergers pre vs. post, 
especially for the sub sample of non-investing firms. Following is our finding: 
The first wave of mergers coincides with 1990-1995 and is known as era of consolidation.  
The second wave happens during 1995-2000 period. Beena (2004) suggest that second phase of 
M&A activities was marked when multinational enterprises started strengthening their position in 
the Indian market. This phase was mostly dominated by merger of firms belonging to same 
business group in similar product and was primarily done to guard against a takeover. Beena (2004) 
could not find any significant evidence of efficiency-related factors influencing M&As that 
happened in India during late nineties.  
The third wave of M&As happens post 2001. The number of mergers increases while and 
the value of acquisition grew manifold. Indian companies not only expanded in India but started 
venturing abroad and made major foreign acquisition during this period. Huge cash reserves, 
enhanced competitiveness, booming Indian market, increasing interest rates, and few regulatory 
changes during this period enabled top players to plan for foreign acquisition. IT services and 
electronics and high technology industries accounted for more than half of cross-border 
transactions post-2000 (“India goes global”, 2006, Accenture report). The graph of mergers in 
different industries is shown in picture below. 
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Picture 1: Sector-wise and Year -wise M&A activity from 2001-2007 
 
Source: Bhalla, Priya. "Determinants of mergers and acquisitions of firms in the Indian 
financial sector: An empirical analysis." IUP Journal of Business Strategy 8.3 (2011): 7. 
 
The third wave of M&A in India coincides with our post reform period as well.  The number of 
M&As were highest in the year 2006. Diverse M&A activities show an increasing trend while the 
ones belonging to same business group decreases during this period (Pandya, 2017). Diverse M&A 
activities increases and the one belonging to same business group decreases during this period 
(Pandya, 2017).  
Acquisition patterns suggest that the post reform period coincides with a concurrent 
increase in internal and external acquisitions by Indian firms.  We conjecture that perhaps firms 
hoard cash to facilitate acquisitions.  
6. Conclusion 
We study the impact of the Clause 49 disclosure reform on financing decisions, financial 
constraints, investment decisions, and firm performance of Indian firms. If the disclosure reform 
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improved information transparency, we would expect to see an increase in firms’ external 
financing, and an increase in their reliance on external financing relative to internal financing. We 
find evidence consistent with this expectation. Measures of external financing increase 
significantly and the ratio of internal to external financing decreases significantly in the period 
after the reform. Moreover, these effects are more pronounced in firms with access to only 
domestic markets relative to firms cross-listed in foreign markets, suggesting that the alleviation 
of adverse selection costs is especially valuable for firms confined to one market. The results are 
robust to a variety of specifications and corrections for endogeneity and self-selection biases. 
Overall, the results suggest that firms modify both the level of capital and the blend of capital in 
response to the reform. 
We also study whether the reforms alleviate financial constraints by creating a capital 
safety net for firms. Following Erel, Jiang, and Weisbach (2015), we study whether the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow and the sensitivity of cash to cash flow decline after the reforms. We 
find a significant decline in these sensitivities post-reform for domestic firms relative to firms 
excluded from reform compliance, as well as firms cross-listed on foreign exchanges. Our results 
are consistent with the reforms relieving financial constraints by creating a stronger capital safety 
net for firms.  
Further, we investigate whether the increase in capital leads to higher investment by firms. 
We find that the expanded funding does not seem to improve investment unambiguously, rather, 
only firms that suffered under-investment prior to the reform show a significant improvement in 
investment post-reform. Counter to our expectations, we document an increase in financial slack 
across all firms. Acquisition patterns suggest that the post reform period coincides with a 
concurrent increase in internal and external acquisitions by Indian firms, suggesting that perhaps 
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the increase in financial slack is intended to facilitate acquisitions. Finally, firm performance 
increases after the reforms with the performance being related to investment increase for firms that 
suffer from under-investment prior to the reform.  
Overall, our results suggest that Clause 49 reforms improve the efficiency of capital 
markets in India by increasing external capital market access to firms, alleviating financial 
constraints, increasing their capital safety net, and improving investment in firms that suffer under-
investment prior to the reforms.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variables  
Measures of Capital: 
TBorrEq      = (Equity + Borrowing)/TA 
TBondEq     = (Equity + Bonds)/TA  
RE      = Retained earnings/TA 
Ratio of RE/ExtFin    = RE/TBorrEq 
Measures of Investment: 
Capex       = [GFA(t)- GFA(t-1) + Sale PPE(t)] / TA(t).  
Investment     = [TA(t) - TA(t-1)] / TA(t-1) 
CapexRD     = [GFA(t)- GFA(t-1) + Sale PPE(t)+R&D(t)] / TA(t) 
Measures of Financial Slack: 
Cash      = Cash and cash equivalents/TA 
Measures of Performance: 
Tobin’s Q      = (TA + Market value of Equity – Book value of Equity)/TA 
ROA       = PAT/TA 
Control Variables: 
Size       = log(TA) 
Cashflow       = (PAT+DA)/TA 
EBDITA      = EBDITA/TA 
Sales Growth       = [Sales(t)- Sales(t-1)] / Sales(t-1) 
M_B       = Market Value of equity/Book value of equity 
STDROA       = 5 years rolling standard deviation of EBDITA 
GDP            = Growth rate of GDP in India in year t         
Interest Rate      = Prime lending rate in India in year t 
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Appendix 2: Time-Period and Sub-Sample Proxies 
Reform Period: 
TD: 1 for Post-reform period (2006-2008) and 0 for Pre-reform (1996-2000).  
Sub-samples: 
CL_NCL: 1 for NCL firms and 0 for CL firms. 
CL_NCLLarge: 1 for NCL-large firms and 0 for CL firms 
Large_Small: 1 for NCL-Small firms and 0 for NCL-Large firms 
NA_NCLSmall: 1 for NCL-Small firms and 0 for EF firms 
Classdummy= 1 for firms belonging to IBG and 0 for stand-alone firms 
FCdummy= 1 for financially constrained and 0 for less constrained firms 
Invdummy = 1 for firms that showed Under-investment using Richardson measure in the pre-
period and 0 for firms that over-invested in the pre-period 
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Appendix 3: Tightened disclosure and corporate governance in India 
Timeline of Events 
Year Announcement 
1991 Cadbury Committee under chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury 
1992 Codes of best practices 
1996 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) task force set up 
1998 Voluntary codes of corporate governance by CII taskforce 
1999 Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee set up by SEBI 
2000 Implementation of Clause 49 
2001 Narayan Murthy committee and Irani committee set up by Ministry of Corporate Affairs  
2002 Naresh Chandra committee set up by SEBI 
2004 Amendments in Clause 49 announced to be implemented from 2005 
2005 Implementation of "Amendments in Clause 49" deferred  
2006 "Amendments in Clause 49" to be implemented from January 1,2006 
2008 Changes in Company's Bill 
2011 
The revised schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 in accordance with IFRS 
requirements requires companies to present financial statements in the new disclosure 
format.17 
2012 Issue of Voluntary guidelines based on Adi Godrej Committee 
2013 Enactment of Revised Companies' Act 
2014 Revised Clause 49 to align provisions with Companies' Act 2013  
 
                                                          
17 As per the new schedule, companies are required to segregate their assets and liabilities into current and non-
current portions. Hence, data on non-current assets and liabilities is available in Prowess only from March 2011 
onwards. 
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Main Covenants of Clause 49 
Clause 49 mandates were to be implemented by: 
• All entities seeking listing for the first time, at the time of listing. 
• All entities included either in Group ‘A’ of the BSE or in S&P CNX Nifty index as on 
January 1, 2000. The deadline was March 31, 2001.  
• All listed entities with paid up share capital of Rs. 10 Crore and above, or net worth of Rs. 
25 crores, deadline being March 31, 2002. 
• All the listed entities with paid up share capital of Rs.3 crore and above, deadline being 
March 31, 2003. 
Provisions of Clause 49 
1. Board of Directors: Composition and category of directors and promoters (including non-
executive director, independent directors, nominee directors). Details of their holdings as a 
lender or equity investor to the company. Attendance of director at the BoD meetings and 
meeting details; details of other Board committee he/she is member of. All pecuniary relations 
or transactions of the non-executive director to be disclosed in the annual report. Independent 
directors should not have any pecuniary relation with the company (other than remuneration) 
that could affect the independence judgement of the director. 
2. Audit Committee: Clause49 also provides clarification on power of audit committee. 
Companies are directed to include the following information in their annual report: brief 
description of terms of reference; composition, name of members; details of meeting and 
attendance held during the year. 
3. Remuneration of directors: Companies to form a remuneration committee and its description, 
including the composition of members, terms of reference, attendance and remuneration policy 
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to be incorporated in the corporate governance section of the annual report. Further, following 
disclosures on remuneration of directors to be disclosed: a) elements of remuneration package 
of individual directors summarized under major groups, such as salary, benefits, bonuses, stock 
options, pension etc. (b) Details of fixed component and performance linked incentives, along 
with the performance criteria. (c) Service contracts, notice period, severance fees. d) stock 
options. 
4. Management: This Management Discussion and Analysis should include discussion on the 
following matters and should form part of the annual report: Industry structure and 
developments, opportunities and threats, segment–wise or product-wise performance, outlook, 
risks and concerns, internal control systems and their adequacy, discussion on financial 
performance with respect to operational performance. Companies were asked to disclose all 
material financial and commercial transactions to the board e.g. dealing in company shares, 
shareholding of management and their relatives etc. 
5. Shareholders: General shareholders’ information to be disclosed in the annual report e.g. 
financial calendar, date of book closure, dividend payment date, listing on stock exchange, 
stock code, market price data, performance in comparison to indices, share transfer system, 
distribution of shareholding, dematerialization of shares and liquidity, outstanding 
GDRs/ADRs/warrants or convertible instruments etc. A shareholder committee to be formed 
to address shareholders’ grievances; number of shareholders’ complaints received, resolved 
and pending to be disclosed in the annual report. 
6. There shall be a separate section on corporate governance in the Annual Report of company, 
with a detailed compliance report including penalties, strictures on the companies by stock 
exchange or SEBI, any matter related to capital market in the last 3 years. 
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7. Summary of transactions with related party including details of individual transaction which 
are not at an arm's length shall be placed before the audit committee. 
Amendments to Clause 49 
The first amendment was made in 2004 to improve quality of financial disclosure to assess 
and disclose business risks. Further, new sections, 23A-O, were inserted in the Securities Contracts 
Regulation Act 1956 that imposed significant penalties on companies for non-compliance 
(Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013). The deadline for compliance with the amendments was set to be 
April 1, 2005, and then moved to Dec. 31, 2005 as many firms were still not in a state of 
preparedness to be fully compliant. 
The following revisions were included in the amendment: 
1. Principle of financial statement if treated differently from the prescribed accounting standard 
shall be disclosed with explanation.  
2. Risk Management: Company should form Risk management committee. The company needs 
to lay down procedures to inform board members about the risk assessment and minimization 
procedure. 
3. Money raised from public issue and uses of funds shall be disclosed to the audit committee on 
a quarterly basis. On annual basis, the company shall prepare a statement of funds utilized for 
purposes other than those stated in the offer document and place it before the audit committee. 
4. Following points were added in the section of remuneration disclosure: The company were 
asked to disclose the number of shares and convertible instruments held by non-executive 
directors in the annual report. Non-executive directors shall be required to disclose their 
shareholding (both own or held by / for other persons on a beneficial basis) in the listed 
company in which they are proposed to be appointed as directors, prior to their appointment. 
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These details should be disclosed in the notice to the general meeting called for appointment 
of such director. 
5. Shareholders: Quarterly results and presentations to analysts to be put on company’s website. 
Shareholder/Investor grievance committee has to be formed to look into the redressal of 
shareholders’ complaints. 
6. CEO/CFO certification: CEO/CFO and managing director should certify to the board that they 
have reviewed financial statements and the cash flow statement for the year and that to the best 
of their knowledge and belief.  
7. The companies are asked to submit a quarterly compliance report to the stock exchanges within 
15 days from the close of quarter duly signed by compliance officer or CEO of the company.  
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